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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
LINBROOI( R.EALTY CORPORATION 
vs . 
. PELL S. ROGERS. 
To the Honorable J'u,stices of the B,upretne ·Court of' .Appeals 
of V ir_qinia : 
Your petitioner, Linbrook Realty Corporation, respect-
fully represents that it is aggrieved by a final judgment of the 
Husting·s Court, Part II, of the City of Richmond, entered on 
the 11th day of April, 1930, in a proceeding therein wherein 
Pell S. Rogers was plaintiff and your petitioner was defend-
ant. 
STATE~IENT OF THE CASE. 
In the lower court Pell S. Rogers 'vas the plaintiff and 
Linbrook Realty Corporation was defendant, and hereafter in 
this petition the parties will be referred to in respect to the 
positions which they respectively occupied in the lower court. 
The plaintiff was the owner of a piece of property at 1817 
Hull Street, Richmond, Virginia, upon which there was a $6,-
500 first mortgage or deed of trust which had been placed on 
said property by the predecessor in title of the plaintiff. 
Whe~ the plaintiff purchased the property he assumed the 
payment of this mortgage or deed of trust in his contract to 
buy property, but when the property was actually conveyed to 
him it was conveyed only subject to the deed of trust. 
The plaintiff, on June 12, 1928, entered into a contract 
with the J.Jinbrook Realty Corporation whereby he agreed 
to convey to the J..Jinbrook Realty Corporation the Hull Street 
prope_rty, the Linbrook Realty Corporation to assume the first 
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mortgage of $6,500.00 and upon the consideration of $9,500.00 
in cash. The Linbrook Realty Corporation in turn agreed to 
sell to· R-ogers in another contract (Transcript pages 14 and 
15) a piece of property on Cleveland Street upon the consid-
eration of said R.ogers assuming first and second mortgages 
thereon. 
Prior to the closing of this deal Haunders ~L Brooks, Presi-
dent of the defendant Corporation, called the plaintiff on 
the telephone and told him that they had resold the Hull 
Street property to a party named Simon Euksuzian ( Tran-
script, page 54). 
At this point the evidence is conflicting a~ to what took 
place in the telephone conversation between Mr. Rogers and 
Mr. Brooks, Mr. Rogers testified (Transcript, page 34) that 
he told Mr. Brooks that he would convey it to Euksuzian but 
that he 'vould not release the defendant under its contract of 
assumption. This was denied by 1\lr. Brooks, who stated 
that Rogers shnply·said that he would be glad to convey the 
property to Euksuzian (Transcript, pa-ges 55 and 60). 
Mr. Brooks told him also that Euksuzian was to assume 
the deed of trust and the evidence shows that the contract be-
tween Brooks and Richardson and Euksuzian called for the 
latter to assume this deed of trust. 
Regardless of what took place in the telephone conversa-
tion. lVIr. R.og·ers prepared the deed from himself to Euk-
suzian but he failed in that deed to have Euksuzian assume 
the deed of trust, merely conveying the property subject t~ 
the deed of trust. · 
Settlement was made on all sides, and the deed recorded, 
l\tf r. Brooks testifying that he did not see the deed to Euksu-
zian as he was no.t interested in that. (Transc.ript, page 68.) 
Subsequently Euksuzian ·defaulted in the payment of the 
deed of trust upon the Hull Street property and same was 
sold at public auction. After making payment of all charges 
and costs of foreclosure, there remained a deficiency. of $1,-
029.08. The noteholder thereupon brought. suit against Mr. 
Rogers for this amount and R.ogers filed grounds of defense 
that he "ras not liable, inasmuch as the deed to him oonveyed 
the property only subject to the deed· of trust .. However, in 
that suit the original contract whereby Rog·ers assumed the 
payment of the deed of trust was introduced in the ~vidence, 
and upon this contract the plaintiff recovered a. judgment. 
These proceedings, however, showed that Rogers did not think 
that he was liable for the payment of this deed of trust as he 
enga~·r.d counsel and contested the suit upon the gTound tlHit 
he did not assume payment of the deed of trust in the deed. 
~.,,,.,.._____ __ _ 
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This is cited here as it has a material bearing upon the case. 
same be set aside, 'vhich motion the court overruled and 
without making any payment whatsoever thereon, Rogers 
brought this suit against the Linbrook Realty Corporation 
upon the contract which it signed to assume the deed of 
trust upon the Hull Street property. Issue was joined and 
the matter submitted to a jury, resulting in a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff, upon which the defendant moved that the 
same to be set aside, which motion the court overruled and 
entered up judgment for the plaintiff. 
It is to this judgment that this application for a writ of 
error and .supersedeas is asked. 
ERR.ORS ASSIGNED. 
The defendant assigns as error the action of the trial court 
in the following respects : 
(1) In overruling the motion of the defendant to exclude 
all of the plaintiff's evidence at the conclusion of such evi-
dence. (Transcript, page 50.} 
(2) In refusing to grant instructions Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 
.5, 6 and 7. (Transcript, page 78.) 
(3) In granting instructions Numbers A, B and D at the 
request of the plaintiff. ·(Transcript, page 81.) 
( 4) In overruling the motion of defendant to set aside the 
verdict for tl1e reasons assig-ned. · (Transcript, page· 83.) 
ARGU~IENT. 
'V e may as well begin by saying that tl1e action of the 
trial court in both refusing the instructions requested by 
the defendant and in granting tl1ose requested by the plain-
tiff was influenced larg·ely, if not wholly, by the decision of 
this court in S'Wain vs. Virginia Bank, 151 Va. 655. In that 
case a. certain Paul Bukva was the owner of real estate in 
:Norfolk, which he encumbered by three deeds of trust, to se-
. cure notes executed only by him. Default having been made 
in the payment of taxes on the property, a sale was had 
-Tinder the third deed of trust at which sale Mrs. Irma G. 
Becker became the purchaser of the property at a nominal 
price, the property being conveyed to her ''subject" to the 
two prior deeds of trust 
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Subsequently, an exchange of properties was arranged be-
tweeRMrs. Becker and A. C. Swain and his wife. By this ex-
change the property above mentioned was to be sold to the 
Swains, among other terms, upon the Swains assuming pay-_ 
ment of the two deeds of trust on said property. It appears 
from that case that Paul Bukva, who was liable for these 
two deeds of trust, wished this provision to be inserted in the 
contract and he, himself, signed the contraet although he 
had no interest therein other than as stated above. 
When the property, however, was conveyed to the Swains, 
the deed only conveyed same subject to the deeds of trust and 
did not require the assumption of same by the S'vains. Just 
how this occurred does uot appear from the decision. 
Default having been made in the payment of some of the 
notes secured in the first deed of trust, the Trustee fore-
closed the property and upon such foreclosure there was de-
ficiency. The noteholder thereupon filed a bill in equity 
~gainst Paul Bukva, A. C. -swain and Anna P . .Swain. Just 
ho_w t~e case got into a court of equity does not appear from 
the decision. 
'l'he court in that case proceeds upon the theory that the 
rule of evidence tha.t the true consideration for a deed may 
be shown by even parol evidence when such consideration is 
· not stated in the deed, is a rule of substantive law. It is, of 
course, almost universally recognized that the true considera-
. tion may be shown, but this is merely a rule of evidence.· 
The question involved was not whether the tTue considera-
tion could be shown, but 'vhether a prior contract could be 
enforced where performance of this contract had been ac-
cepted in a manner other than as prescribed by the terms of 
the contract. 
We call particular attention to the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Christian in this case because the points made by that 
learned jurist are applicable to this case. 
·He points out that there could be no consideration for 
Mvs. Becker, inasmuch as she 'vas not liable on the mort-
gages. Similarly, in our case, Pell Rogers did not think that 
he was liable upon the deed of trust which was foreclosed, as 
evidenced by the fact that he was careless enough not to re-
quire Euksuzian to assume it and when he was asked for the 
deficiency defendant upon the very ground whieh we now 
make here, namely, that the deed to him did not require as-
sumption of the deeds of trust. 
: ... ..-·---=. 
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INSTRUCTION NUl\iBER ONE. 
''The Gourt instructs the jury that if they believe from 
the evidence that the plaintiff, Pell S. Rogers, was advised 
by the defendant, LiJnbrook R-ealty ·Corporation, that it had 
sold the property known ·as 1817 Hull Street to Simon Euksu-
zian and that said Euksuzian had agreed to assume the first 
deed of trust for Sixty-five Hundred Dollars ($6,500) and 
requsted said Pell S. Rogers- to m'ake a deed to said Euksu-
zian direct, ·an~ that~ said Pell S. Rogers agreed to do this 
and agreed 'to. ·accept said Euksuzia.n in the place of Lyn-
brook Realty Corporation and executed the deed dated June 
22, 1928, to said Euksuzian to said proper_ty on Hull 
Street, then ·the law implies· ·a novation from said cir-
cumstances:all.d a substitution of· 'said Lynbrook Realty ·Cor-
poration and the consequent' release of said. Lynbrook Realty 
Corporation from any liability on the contract of June 12, 
1928, and· -yonr verdict should be 1 or the defendant.'' 
I • • 
This instruction embodies the well-l{nown;1aw of nova-
tion, and we· believe is a correct statement thereof. It must 
be remembeted that the· parties to this litig·ation · are a.ll lay-
men and ·we ·should. interpret- their actions in the light of 
what the parties rnanifestly intended. · · · 
Pell Rogers did not think that he was· liable ·on the deed 
of trust in question. The Linbrook Realty Corporation h~d 
agreed in the ·c(nitract to assume it. Euksuzian hn.d agreed. 
in his contract !with the· Linbrook Realty Corporation to as-
sume it. It was safisfa~tory to Euksuzian; it was satisfactory 
to the Linbrook R.ealty Corporation'; and ii was satisfactory 
to Pell R-ogers. This is all that is required o£ ·a novation, 
namely, that the three parties thereto all consent.' ' I 
It is true that R.ogers stated in his evidence .. that·!he· put 
certain conditions to his acceptance. The iri.stru.etion re-
quested would not have done violence to his exceptions, but 
would have protected him had the jury ·believed that· he did 
make such statements, for the instruction required that the 
jury should :find that he ''agreed to accept Euksuzian' in the 
place of Linbrook Realty Corporation". · · 
We do not think it necessary- to . cite-. a:uthority · upon the 
law of novation for it is well' known that the· intent of the 
parties governs, and it is submitted' that th·e instruction re-
quested is a correct statement of raw and 'that the failure to 
give same constituted prej~dicial errbr~ , 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER TWO. 
''The Court instructs the jury that when a deed has been 
executed and delivered as a performance of an executory 
contract for the conveyance of real estate that then the rights 
of the parties rest thereafter solely in the deed although 
the deed may vary from the executory contract. And if you 
believe from the evidence that the plaintiff Pell S. Rogers 
did not require, and the defendant, Linbrook Realty Corpo-
ration, did not actually assume the deed of trust for $6,500 by· 
executing said deed, then your verdict should. be for the de-
fendant.'' 
This instruction embodies 'vhat is believed to have been 
the la'v of Virginia for many years. We shall refer briefly 
to a fe,v cases where it was involved. 
In Shenandoah Valley R. R. Co. vs. Dunlop, 86 Va. 346, 
the rule is stated thus where the court is discussing the ques-
tion of reforming a deed: 
"Of course the danger in reforming a written ·contract is 
not as great where the alleged mistake is made out by u. pre-
liminary written instrument or agreement, as where parol evi-
dence only is admitted. But even in such a case, said the 
courts in Carter vs. JYI c.A stor, 28 Grat.t. 356, it must be made 
plainly to appear that the parties intended in their final in-
strument, merely to carry into effect the arrangement set 
forth in the prior agreement. 'The very circumstance', it was 
added, 'that the final instrument differs from the preliminary 
contract, affords of itself a presumption of an intentional 
change of purpose or agreement, unless there is some re-
cital in it, or some. other attendant circumstance·, which de-
monstrates that it w·as merely in pursuance of the original 
contract.' See also, Leas' Exo' vs. Eidson, 9 Gratt. 277; 
Man.zy vs. Sel/.a.is, 26 Id. 641; F1.t.dge vs. Payne, a1~te, p. 303; 
Hean·~e 'vs. Jfarine Ins. Co., 20 Wall. 488; Ly1nan vs. United· 
Ins. ·Co,_, 2 Johns. Ch. 630; 2 Porn. Eq., sec. 859. 
''Nor is there· any gTound for the cancellati_on of the deed .. 
The charge of fraud (if, indeed, it can be treated as a charge-
un~upported by proof of any kind ; and as to the alleged ver-
bal agreement contemporaneous with the execution of the· 
deed, that. the terms of the preliminary contract should re-
main in full force, it is enough to say that nothing is .better 
settled, either at law or in equity, than that, in the absence-
of fra\ld, accident, or mistake, the deed must be conclusively 
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presumed to contain the whole agreement between the parties. 
In other words, the terms of the deed cannot be varied bY. 
parol evidence, of what occurred between the parties previ-
ously thereto or contemporaneously therewith.'' 
Ag·ain in Stephen Putney S,l~oe Co. vs. R. F. ~ P. R. Co., 
116 V a. 211, the court has this to say: 
''It is true as argued that when the shoe company accepted 
the deed from the Fair Grounds Company, all prior negotia-
tions including the executory contract were merged in the 
deed, and although its provision was different from that con-
tained in the executory contract as to the 27 foot strip, the 
deed must be looked to for the purpose of determining the 
rights of the parties to it, and that the shoe company only ac-
quired 'such rights and privileges' in th~ 27 foot as are 
granted by the deed." 
In Woodson vs. Smith, 128 Va. 552, a contract. provided 
that the grantor should retain possession of the property 
for eight months, but this was omitted in the deed. In 
an ejectment suit brought by the grantee it was held that , 
· tbe contracts should be exCluded as they were merged in the 
deeds, using this language: 
"The rule is that when a deed is executed- and accepted 
in performance of a ·prior preliminary contract, the deed, 
if unambiguous in its terms, and unaffected by fraud or mis-
take, must be looked to alone as the final agreement of the 
parties. The deeds here involved were unmistakably clear in 
meaning. There is n() ingredient of fraud or mistake in the 
case, and if there were, the plaintiff could not avail him-
self of it in this form of action. 
''If the pl~intiff desired to preserve the provision in the 
contracts for a deferred delivery of possession as against 
the plain terms of his covenants in the subsequent deeds, -he 
ought to have done so by repeating them in the deeds or in 
~ome contemporaneous collateral instrument so expressed 
a~ to make it manifest that the two were intended to be parts 
of the same transaction.' ' 
The language of the court in that case, were it not for the 
~w·ain case, would be decisive of the issue raised here. 
In Porls'mouth Refining Co. vs: Oliver, etc., 109 Va. 513, the 
contract provided that the plant should be in good running 
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order, but this was omitted in the deed. In an action brought 
on the contract in which a judgment was rendered for the 
plaintiff, same was reversed by this court, 'vhere it is stated: 
''The general rule is and no rule is better settled than 
that where a deed has been· executed and accepted as a per-
formance of an executory contract to convey real estate, the 
rights of the parties rest- thereafter solely in the deed. This 
is true although the deed thus accepted varies from that pro-
vided for in the contract, and the law remits the grantee to 
his covenants in his dee.d, if there is no ingredient of fraud 
. or mistake in the case.'' 
. In Charles vs. 1l1 cClanahan., 130 Va. 682, the contract pro-
v~ded for the conveyanc-e of the entire interest of the gran-
tor, but 'vhen the deed 'Vas made the grantor reserved one-
half of the mineral underlying the surface. In a suit in 
·equity to reform the deed, the court, in refusing reformation, 
makes this comment :- . 
"In the absence of fraud or mistake in the instrument it-
self, the rule is universal, applicable to deeds as well as to 
all other contracts, that prior stipulations and understand-
ings are merged in the final and formal contract executed by 
the parties, and when a deed has been delivered and accepted 
as performance of an antecedent contract to convey, the con-
tract is merged in the deed. 
"In Slocum vs. Bt·acy, 55 1\t[inn. 249, 56 N. W. 826, 43 Am. 
St. Rep. 499, it is said that ''no rule of l~w is better settled 
than that where a deed has been executed and accepted as 
performance of an executory contract to convey real estate, 
the contract is functus officio, and the rights of the parties 
rest thereafter solely on the deed.'' 
. · · Nor is this view confined to Virginia. To the same effect 
·i~ Frisbie vs. Scott (J(an.), 201 8. W. 561, where the contract 
called for a warranty deed, and the other party accepted a 
·warranty deed from a third person, not a party to the con-
tract. He broug·ht a suit ag·ainst the party with whom he had 
a contract and the court said this: ,, 
'' 'The prim-Or facie presumption rif' hnv, arising from the 
acceptance of the deed is that it is an execution of the whole 
contract, and the rights and remedies of the parties, in rela-
Lin brook Realty Corp. v: Pell S. Rogers. 9 
tion to the contract, are to be determined by the deed, and 
the original agreement becomes void.' 
''It may be well to observe here that in the case at bar. 
there is nothing tending in the remotest way to show that 
there were covenants in the contract collateral to the deeds 
to be delivered, and hence nothing to attack or destroy the 
prim,a facie effect of the unconditional acceptance of Stans-
bury's deed under the- contract. In Sloc·u1n vs. Bracy, 55 
~linn. 249 loc. cit. 252, 56 N. W. 826, 827 (43 Am. St. Rep. 
499),. it is said: 
" 'No rule of law is better settled than that where a deed 
has been executed and accepted as performance of an execu-
tory contract to convey real estate, the contract is fu~YtCius 
offic·io, and the rights of the parties rest thereafter solely on 
the deed. This is all although the deed thus accepted varies 
from that stipulated for in the contract, as where the vendee 
acept.s the deed of a third party in lieu of the deed of his 
vendor; and as, in the sales of land, the law remits the party 
to his covenants in his deed, if there be no ingredient of fraud 
or mistake in the case, and the party has not taken the pre-
caution to secure .himself by covenants; he has no remedy for 
his money, even on failure of title.' '' 
Also in American Savings Bank v. Borcherding, et al. 
(Iowa), 208 N. vV. 518, the contract provided that the vendee 
should assume payment of the mortgage, but when the deed 
was written it provided only that the vendee took the prop-
erty subject to the mortgage. In holding that the vendee was 
not liable on the mortgage, the court has this to say: 
''On the face of the record it appears that these parties, 
on the execution of the contract, made and accepted the deed 
with a clause in it providing that the vendee took it subject to 
the mortgage. In the absence of any showing to the contrary 
it must be assumed, therefore, that the clause with reference 
to assumption of the mortg·age was Waived and abandoned 
by the parties in the making and 'delivering of this deed.'' 
Authorities might be multiplied on this point, but we be-
lieve that we l1ave cited enough to show that the tn1e rule is 
that while the true consideration for a deed may be shown 
by parol, it cannot be shown in any case where it would do 
violence to the established law that the. deed is the sole in-
strument to which recourse must be had for the substantive 
rights of the parties as between themselves. If this were 
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not true, there would be no security whatsoever in real estate 
transactions for all sorts of claims and contentions might be 
brought forward to upset executed transactions and con-
tracts. It is much safer to have the rights of the parties rest · 
upop a solemn sea~ed instn1ment, in the preparation of which, 
all parties to the original contract have a· right to have a 
voice and to have inserted therein such provisions as they 
may believe to be justified either by the· prior written con-
tract or by the verbal negotiations of the parties. To upset 
this rule 'vould make all real estate transactions fraught with ' 
danger. 
What has been said on this subject and the authorities 
cited are applicable to the remainder of the instructions re-
quested by the defendant and refused by the court, except 
Instruction Number six. These authorities are also perti-
nent upon the motion of the defendant to set the verdict aside 
as contrary to the law and .the evidence, and we shall now 
confine ourselves to the sole remaining point to be treated in 
this brief. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER SIX. 
''The Court instructs the jury that under no circumstances 
can the plaintiff recover in this case unless he prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the defendant actually as-
sumed the payment of the said deed of trust for $6,500.00 
and that the plaintiff, Peli ~s. Rogers, has actually paid out 
the amount he claims on account of said deed of trust so as-
sumed, and in no event can he recover anything in excess of 
the amount he actually so paid out, and if the plaintiff· fails 
to prove any of the foreg·oing facts the verdict should be for 
the defenda11t." 
This instruction brings before the consideration of the 
court. the question of whether or not a party liable for the 
payment of a mortgage can recover from his subsequent 
grantee without actually paying the mortgage himself. It 
will be remembered tha{ from the statement of the facts Pell 
S. Rogers has not paid out one cent on account of the defi-
ciency remaining after the foreclosure of the mortgaage in 
question. It is true that a judgment has· been rendered 
ag·ainst him, but he has paid out nothing on account thereof,· 
and it is our contention that he is not entitled to maintain 
this action until he has actually paid the judgment which 
has been rendered against him. 
We wish to state frankly to the court that there is very 
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xespectable authority upon both sides of this question, ·but 
'\Ve believe the better view to be that a contract of one person 
to pay th-e debt of another is a contract of indemnity only 
and that, therefore, a grantor of mortgaged premises cannot 
maintain an action against his grantee until he, the grantor, 
has paid the debt. 
In Hildredth vs. Walker (Mo.), 187 S. W. 608, a similar 
"Sitqation arose and the court held that the grantee occupied 
ihe position of principal and the grantor that of surety and 
found that it was well settled that Ha surety can maintain 
no action looking to the enforcement of a debt for which he is 
surety, until he has paid the same' 1• 
In Falkne'r -vs. McHenry (Pa.), 83 Atlantic 827, a situation 
almost identical with that here arose except that there was 
no question of a deed to a third person. Judgment had been 
rendered against the grantor but he had not paid it. The 
court held that the contract was one of indemnity and that· 
no recovery could be had without proof of loss. 
Again in Gu.nst vs. P ellarn (Texas), 12 S. W. 233, the land 
'vas sold to one party who agreed to assume the mortgage 
and resold by him to another who likewise agreed to assume 
the same. In an action by the intermediate grantee against 
his subsequent graJltee, the court said: · 
"'Upon the conveyance of the property to Johnson, and 
Jopnson assuming to pay the note secured by the mortgage, 
the plaintiff acquired no immediate right of action against 
Johnson upon the promise. The promise ·was to pay the 
l1olders of the note, and not him. As between plaintiff and 
.T ohnson, by the agreement Johnson became primarily liable 
to pay the note but plaintiff could only acquire a right of 
action against him upon the promise by paying the note 
himself." 
Numerous other cases to the same effect might be cited. 
The precise question does not appear to have arisen in Vir-
ginia, although the question is one of grea.t importance, and 
the law thereon should be settled since as a result of the 
depreciation in real estate, undoubtedly the question will be-
come of paramount importance in the very neat future when 
the readjustment or values. is had. 
We submit that the better view should prevail, and that 
the refusal of the court to give the instruction Number Six 
requested by the defendant constituted prejudicial error. 
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CONCLUSION. 
In conclusion, with all deference, it is submitted that the 
aforesaid case of Swain vs. Vi,rginia Bank, 151 V a. 655, 
should be again reviewed by this Honorable Court and the 
conclusions expressed therein be distinguished from a case 
such as that now presented in this petition. 
In the light of the foregoing observations, and for the rea-
sons set forth, it is respectfully submitted that the verdict 
and judgment here are erroneous, and your petitioner, there-
- fore, respectfully, prays that a writ of error and supersedeas 
to the judgment complained of be awarded it 3lld that same 
l?e reviewed and reversed. Petitione~ adopt~ this petition as 
its opening brief and desires to present orally said petition. 
And your petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
LINBROOl{ R.EALTY CORPORATION, 
By \¥ILLIAl\iiS & MULLEN, Counsel.. 
WILLIAl\tiS & l\1:ULLEN, 
GUY B. HA.ZELGRO·VE, 
For Petitioner. 
The undersigned counsel, practicing· in the .Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia, hereby certify that in their judgment 
there is error in the judgment complained of in the foregoing 
petition, and that the same should be reviewed. 
We hereby certify that a copy of the petition was delivered 
to opposing counsel, Thomas A. \Villiams, Esquire, on the 
29th day of September, 1930. 
LEWIS vVILLIAl\tiS, 
GUY 'B. HAZELGROVE, Counsel. 
I hereby acl{nowiedge receipt of on the 29th day of Sep-
tember, 1930, a copy of the foregoing petition for appeal and 
supersedeas. 
Received Sept. 29, 1930. 
Oct. 28, 1930. 
THO~tJ:AS A. WILLIA~tJ:S, 
Atton1ey for Pell S. Rogers. 
H. S. J. 
Writ of en· or and supersedea-s allo,\red. Bond $2,000.00. 
LOUIS S. EPES 
Received Oct 28, 1930. 
H. S. ,J. 
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Pleas had before the Hustings Court, Part II, of the City 
of Richmond, Va., on the 11th. day of April, 1930. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: On the 8th day 
of February, 1930, came the plaintiff, Pell S. Rogers, and filed 
the following Notice of Motion for Judgment against the de-
fendant the Lin brook Realty Gorporation, to-,vit: 
Virginia: 
In The Hustings Curt, Part II, of the City of Richmond. 
Pell S. Rog·ers, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Linbrook Realty Corporation, Defendant. 
To Lin brook Realty Corporation: 
You are hereby notified that on the 24th day of February, 
1930, at 11 o ''clock A. :NJ ., or as soon thereafter as counsel can 
be heard, the undersigned will move the Judg~ of the 1-Iust-
ings Court, Part II, of the City of Richmond, Virginia, at 
the court house, thereof, for a jl~dgment against you in the 
sum of $1,029.08 with interest thereon from the 22nd day of 
~{ay, 1929, until paid, together with the costs incident to 
this proceeding, all of which is justly due from you to the 
undersigned, under and by virtue of a contract in writing, 
bearing date of June 12th, 1928, by and between you and the 
undersigned, a copy of which is hereto a.ttached and is, by 
this reference made part hereof as fully and completely as 
though set out herein in haec verba; the undersigned having 
deed the property, mentioned in said contract, at your re-
quest, to Simon Euskuzian subject to said mortgage or deed 
of trust mentioned in said contract, which de«?d of trust you 
assumed under said contract; default having been made in 
the payment of the notes secured by said deed of trust; the 
trustee under said deed of trust having been required by 
the noteholders, secured by said deed of trust, to sell the 
property under the terms of said deed of trust, and · said 
.trustee, having fully complied with the termf? of said deed of . 
trust, having sold a.t a public auction, on the 22nd day of 
Niay, 1929, to the highest bidder, the property mentioned 
in the said contract for the sum of $6,010.00 under the said 
deed of trust; the sa~d trustee having incurred and expended 
in costs and ·expenses in and about the sale of said prop-
erty, and the payment of taxes, the aggreg·ate sum of $47 4.08, 
in accordance with the terms of said deed of trust, 
14 ' Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia. 
page 2 ~ which you assumed in said contract aforemen-
. tioned, which sum, together with the deficiency in 
the purchase price at said public auction, and the amount 
of said notes secured by said deed of trust plus interest at six 
per cent per annum on the sum of $6,500.00 from the due 
date of said notes, secured by said deed of trust, to-wit, March 
23rd, 1929, to the date of sale under the said deed of trust, 
to-wit, May 22nd, 1929, .makes the sum of $1,029.08, owing 
by you to the undersigned, to make up said loss as provided 
by said contract, as shown by the following stat~ment: 
Amount of notes secured by deed of trust 
J. W. ::Moore, auctioneer, fee for sale 
Advertisement of sale, newspaper, 
City taxes, last half 1928 and interest 
City taxes, prorated to date of sale 
Writing deed of bargain and sale . 








Commissioner's and Clerk's fees for auditing and 
recording account of sale · 
Interest on $6500.00 from l\{arch 23rd, 1929, to 
May 22nd, 1929, at 6% per annum 
Total Amount Due By You Under Contract 





Leaving a balance due the undersigned by you of $1,029.08 
Whereas, the undersigned having complied with and fully 
performed all the terms conditions and covenants on behalf of 
the undersigned stipulated in said contract, and default hav-
ing been made by you in the paym.ent of said notes, said 
sum is due and unpaid, although payment thereof has been 
often requested and demand, and the undersigned is justly en-
titled to recover of you in this proceeding, the said sum, with 
interest thereon as aforesaid. 
Hence this proceeding. 
Given under my hand this the 20th day of January, 1930. 
Respectfully, 
THO·}.!IAS A. WILLIAMS, 
L. C~ O'CONNOR, p. q. 
PELL S. ~O·GERS, 
By counsel. 
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Linbrook Realty Corp. v. Pell S. Rogers. 15 
COPY 
Brooks & Richardson, Inc. 
Realtors 
118 North Eight ·Street 
Richmond, ,V a. 
I hereby agree to give Sixteen Thousand and 00/100 Dol-
lars, ($16,000.00), payable $9,500.00 Cash and assume first 
trust of $6,500.00 for the following property: 1817 Hull St., 
Richmond, Va. Store and Hat above,· subject to contract at-
. tached, provided the title is free from valid objections; (sub-
ject to any restrictions now on the property), to be settled for 
at the office of Brooks & Richardson, Inc, Agents, on or be-
fore June 22, 1928, or as soon thereafter as title can be ex-
amined and papers prepared, allowing a reasonable time to 
correct any objections reported by the Title Examiner. AC!r 
tual possession of premises subject to lease of present tenant. 
Taxes, interest, insurance and rents to be prorated as of day 
of settlement. 
I hereby make a deposit of $10.00 to bind this contract; 
:which is to be applied on purchase price; or refunded if title 
is not good or this offer not accepted within three days. 
vVitness the following signatures and seals at Richmond, 
\T a., this 12th day of June, 1928. 
LINBROOK R.EALTY CORP.OR.ATION 
By SAUNDERS M. BROOI{S. 
Address .................. . 
Examiner .................. . 
I hereby accept the above offer, and agree to pay Brooks 
& Richardson, Inc., Agents, regular commission, as per tariff 
of the Richmond Real Estate Exchange, on $10,000.00. 
PELL S. ROGERS (.Seal) 
(Seal) 
It is understood and agreed that there are no verbal ar- ' 
rangements in relation to this contract · 
page. 4 } State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
Personally appeared before me, L. C. O'Connor,. a notary 
16 .Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
public in and for the state and city aforesaid, ·Pell S. Rogers, 
who, being duly sworn by me, says that he is the plaintiff 
named in the foregoing action; that tile amount of the 
plaintiff's claim is $1,029.08; that the said sum is justly due 
from the defendant to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff 
claims interest thereon from the 22nd day of May, 1929, un-
til paid; tha.t the several items of the plaintiff's claim and 
the credits so far as the same exist are shown on the said 
account. 
PELL S. ROGERS, Affiant. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this the 20th day of 
January, 1930. 
page 5 ~ 
L. C. O'CONNOR, 
Notary Public. 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT. 
Filed Deby. lOth 1930. 
The said defendant for answer to Notice of l\iotion for 
judgment in the above styled cause, pleads not guilty. And, 
with this, the said defendant puts itself upon the Country. 
page ? ~ 
LINBROOI( REALTY ·CORPORATION 
By A. ELLIS BAI(ER, Its Counsel. 
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT. 
E,iled Feby 24th, 1930. 
State of Virginia : 
City of Richmond: To-Wit: 
This day personally appeared before me, Gladys L. Car-
ter, a Notary Public in and for the City aforesaid, in the 
State of Virginia, Saunders :LVI. Brooks, President and Agent 
of Linbrook Realty Corporation, who made oath before me 
in my said City that he is the President and Agent of the 
Linbrook Realty Corporation, defendant in the above entitled 
action, and that he verily believes that the plaintiff is not en-
titled to recover anything from the defendant on the claim 
asserted in said action. · 
SA.UNDERS M. BROOKiS, Affiant. 
Linbrook Realty Corp. v. Pell S. Rogers. 17 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of Feb-
ruary, 1930. 
GLADYS L. CARTER, 
Notary Public. 
~{y Comm Exp. ~fch _5th J932. _ 
page 7 } A:qd at another day, to-w~t: 
At a like Hustings Court, Par·t II, continued by adjourn-
ment and held for the said city, on the 11th day of April, 1.930. 
. .· .. 
This day c~me. th_e parties in person and by Counsel, there-
upon the Plaintiff by Counsel as~ed leave of Court to amend 
his Notice .of ~otion by inserting_: :June 12 in place of Mar 
2 in the original :i;f.otice of ~{otion, there· being no objection 
by the Defendant by Counsel, the Court allowed the said 
amendment to be made, and the Defendant by Counsel having 
filed in 'vriting his Count~r Affidavit & plea of Not guilty at 
a former day of tl1is Cpurt. a:nd put himself upon the country, 
and the .Plai1)tiff likewise. and issue is J joined thereupon. 
Whereupou.came a p.anel of nine qualifiep jurors free from 
the excetion for the trial of the issue joined in this case, and 
from said panel of nine qualified jurors the parties by their 
Attorneys beginning· :with the Plaintiff alternately struck 
from said ·pane.l t~1e .n~pi~~ qf_ one juror each, the remaining 
seven constituted and composqd th.~ j_ury ~ori t_;h,e trial of the 
issue joined in this case, to-wit: G. W. Wilde, Jesse Rosh-
schild, E. L:.: Q~rmon, J. A. Reidel back, C. E. Bott01ps, L. H. 
Bridgewater & Leonard vVhitten who being elected tried and 
sworn the truth to speak upon the issue joined ·anddha.ving 
fully heard the evidence of the Plaintiffs, the· ·Defendant by 
Counsel moved the Court to exclude the plaintiffs~ ~vidence, 
which motion the Court denied, to which ruling of the Court, 
the Defendant by Counsel excepted, thereupon the. eyidence 
being fully heard and arguments of Counsel the jury retired 
to their room to. consult upon a verdict, and aftet~ ·sometime 
returned into Court and rendered the following verdict, to-
wit: We tl1e Jury on the issue joined find for· th~ lJ.laintiff for 
the sum of $1,029.08 with Inte~~§t fr.om lM:ay 22nd 1929" 
Jesse Rothschild Foreman. And then the Jlirv was dis-
charged. Thereupon the D~;fendant · by- ·Gounsel· made the 
following motions, that the ve1!dict" o£. th·e· jury be set aside 
on the ground .~~l~t. said vel)Gi~t;.~a_s ~~~~ary to the la'v and 
the evidence, Errors committea during the trial of this case. 
In refusing evidence offered by the Defendant and allowing 
18 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
evidence offered by the Plaintiff over the objection of the 
Dfendant, Defusal to exclude all Plaintiffs· evidence & Mis-
direction on the law by the Court to th.e Jury, which ·motions 
the Court overruled, to which ruling of the Court the De-
fendant by Counsel excepted. Therefore it is considered by 
. the Court that the Plaintiff do recover of the De-
page 8 ~ fendant the sum of One Tl1ousand & Twenty Nine 
Dollars and eight cents with interest. from the May 
22nd 1929 until paid and his costs by him in this behalf ex-· 
pended. 
And the said Defendant by Counsel having expressed his 
desire to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
for a writ of error and ·supersedeas, it is ordered that the e;x:e-
cution of this judg·ment be suspended for a period of ninety 
days in order to enable the said Defendant to apply for said 
writ, but this order is not. to be effective unless the Defend-
ant or some one for it shall within 10 days from the entry 
of this order enter into a. bond in the penalty of $300.00 with 
surety to be approved by Clerk of this Court according to 
law. The said Defendant is given a period of 60 days within 
whieh to :file such Bills of Exceptions as it is advised is 
proper. 
Memo.: During the trial of this case various and sundry 
exceptions were taken by both Plaintiff and Defendant to sun-
dry rulings of this Court. _ 
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1\-lr. Thomas A. Williams, 
Counsel for Pell S. Rogers, 
Richmond, Va. 
June 3, 1930. 
In Re: Pell R. Rogers v. Lynbrook Realty Corporation 
Dear Sir: 
Please be advi~ea that on the 6th day of June, 1930, at 
10:00 A. M., we shall present to the Judge of the Husting·s 
·court, Part II, in Chambers, Bills of Exception in the above 
entitled cause. 
For your convenience we are enclosing herewith copies 
of said Bills of Exception which will be presented at said 
time. If these Bills of Exception meet with your approval 
Linbrook Realty Corp. v. Pell S. Rogers. 19 
will you kindly advise us beforehand in order that we may 





Yours very truly; 
WILLIAMS & MULLEN, 
Counsel for Lynbrook Realty Corp. 
THOS. A. WILLIAMS, p. q. 
page 10 } And at another day, to-wit: 
At a like Hustings Court, Part II, continued by adjourn-
ment and held for the said City, on the 6th day of June, 1930. 
This day again came the parties by their attorneys, and 
the Defendant' by Counsel, pursuant to leave heretofore 
given it tendered its Certificate of Exceptions #1 to 4, in-
clusive, which were duly signed, sealed & dated and ordered 
to be made a part of the record, which is accordingly done. 
page 11 } :Virginia : 
In the Hustings Court, Part II, of the City of 
Richmond. 
Pell S. Rogers 
vs. 
Lynbrook Realty Corporation. 
CERTIFICATE OF EVIDENCE. 
The following evidence on behalf of the plaintiff and of 
the defendant respectively as hereinafter denoted, is all of 
the evidence that was introduced on the trial of this eause. 
(The Clerk will here copy the original transcript of the 
evidence, duly initialled by the Judge with the initials E. H. 
W., together with the exhibits referred to therein. 
• 
20 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
STENOGRAPHER'S TRAN1SCRIPT. 
Virginia: 
In the Hustings Court, Part II, of the City of Richmond. 
·This is all the evidence in this case. June 6th, 1930. 
ERNEST H. WELLS, Judge. 
Peli S. Rogers 
vs. 
Linbrook R-ealty Corporation. 
Date Taken April- 11th, 1930. 
Virginia: :. 0 
0 
k 
In Hustings Court,. Part II, of t~e City of Richmond. 
April 11th, 1930. 
Pell S. Rogers 
vs. 
Linbrook R-ealty Corporation. 
Plaintiff's Attorneys: Tl1os. A. Williams and L. C. O'Con-
nor; Defendant's Attorneys: Guy B. Hazelgrove and A. 
Ellis Baker. 
STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
page 12 ~ PELL S. ROGERS, 
the plaintiff in his own behalf, being 'first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
By 1\-fr. 0 'Connor: 
· · QrYou are :.M:r. Pell S. H.ogers, the plaintiff in this suitY 
A; Yes, sir. 
0 ~Q:' Mr. Rogers, I have here a certain contract signed by 
the .. ,Lin brook Realty Corporation Corporation and Pell S. 
Rogerst.da.ted June 12, 1928, concerni:rut. tpe sale or trade of 
properties, among which is 1817 Hun.etreet, and ask you to 
take this contract aud introduce it in evidence as ''Ex. Rogers 
#1''. . 
Linbrook Realty Corp. v. Pell S. Rogers. 21 
Mr. Hazelgrove: At this point I ask that the jury be ex-
cluded and I move Your Honor to exclude this evidence. 
NOTE: The jury were sent from the Courtroom. 
J\tir. Hazelgrove: This brings us to the First question of 
law in this case. I will say our motion is predicated upon 
the opening statement of counsel which 've be-
page 13 ~ lieve we have a right to consider in making our 
motion to exclude the evidence. 
The Court: It has been decided to the contrary. The open-
ing statement of counsel is no part of the testimony in the 
case. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: I kno"r that. Of course, the rule is dif-
ferent in the Federal court ,,~here you can direct a verdict, 
l>ut Your If on or may consider the facts stated by counsel in 
the opening statement, being a statement of what he expects 
to prove. He expects to prove this contract was followed by 
a deed to Euksuszian, to whom the Linbrook Realty Corpo-
ration sold the property. Will you consider that now? 
The Court: I can't consider the opening statement mad(' 
by counsel as to what he expects to prove as evidence in the 
case. 
!:Ir. Hazelgrove: ~iy motion then is untimely because of 
the fact there is no evidence before Your Honor. 
The Court: You may get up and say you expect to prove 
so and so and. may not attempt to do so. It is wholly a matter 
of election and I can't consider that as part uf 
page 16 ~ the evidence in the case-the opening· statement 
of either party. 
J\Ir. Hazel~Tove: I shall have to reserve that motion until 
a later time when' the admissibility of this evidence is appar-
ent from other testimony. 
The Court: Yes. Bring t.he jury back. 
NO'l'E: The jury returned to the courtroom. 
A.. This is a copy of the contract. 
NOTE: Papers filed and marked, ''Ex. Rogers 1-A anu 
1-B". 
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page 14 ~ EX. ROGERS #1-A. 
Broo.ks & Richardson, Inc. 
Realtors 
118 North Eight Street 
Richmond, Va. 
I hereby agree to give Sixteen Thousand and 00/100 Dol~ 
lars ($16,000.00), payable $9500.00 Cash and assume first 
trust of $6500.00 for the following property: 1817 Hull St., 
Richmond, Va. Store and flat above. 
Copy 
Subject to contract attached. 
provided the title is fr~e from valid objections; (subject to 
any restrictions now on the property), to be settled for at 
the office of Brooks & Richardson, Inc., Agents, on or be-
fore June 22, 1928, or as soon thereafter as title can be ex-
amined and papers prepared, allowing a reasonable time to 
correct any objections reported by the Title Examiner. Ac-
tual possession of premises subject to lease of' present ten-
ant. Taxes, interest, insurance and rents to be prorated as 
of day of· settlement. 
I hereby make a deposit of $10.00 to bind this contract; 
which is to be applied on purchase price; or refunded if title 
is not good or this offer not accepted within three days. 
Witness the following signatures and seals at Richmond, 
Va., this 12th day of June, 1928. 
LINBROOK REALT·Y CORPORATION 
By SAUNDERS 1\L BROOKS. 
Address ... : ........... . 
Examiner ................ . 
I hereby accept the above offer, and agree to pay Brooks 
& Richardson, Inc., Agents, regular commission, as per tariff 
of the Richmon~ Real Estate Exchange on $10,000. 
PELL S. ROGERS, (.Seal) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Seal) 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED THAT THERE 
ARE NO VERBAL ARRANGEMENTS IN RELATION TO 
THIS CO·NTRACT.. . 
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page 15} EX. ROGERS #l-B. 
Brooks & Richardson, Inc. 
~ealtors . 
118 North Eight .Street 
Richmond, Va. 
I hereby agree to give Twenty-six Thousand and 00/100 
Dollars, ( $26,000.00), payable $9500.00 cash and assume 1st. 
trust of $15,000.00 and give 2nd. Mortgage of $1500.00 pay-
able $500.00 per year for a period of three years for the fol-
lowing property: 302 No. Cleveland St., Richmond, Va. 6 
apartment buildings. 
Copy 
Subject to contract attached. 
provided the title is free from valid objections: (subject to 
any restrictions now on the property), to be settled for at 
the office of Brooks & Richardson, Inc., Agents, on or before 
J nne 22, 1928, or as soon thereafter as title can be examined 
and papers prepared, allowing a reasonable time to correct 
any objections reported by the Title Examiner. Actual pos-
session of premises subject to lease or present tenant. Taxes, 
interest, insurance and rents to be prorated as of day of 
settlement. 
I hereby make a depo.sit of $10.00 to bind this contract; 
which is to be applied on purchase price; or refunded if title 
is not good or this offer not accepted within 3 days. 
·Witness the following signatures and seals at Richmond, 
Va., this 12th day of June, 1928. 
PELL S. ROGERS 
I hereby l\CCept the above offer, and agree to pay Brooks 
& Richardson, Inc., Agents, regular commi~sion, as per tariff 
of the Richmond Real Estate Exchange. 
LINBROOK REALTY CORP 
.By SAUNDERS M. BROOKS 
Address ............... .. 
Examiner ................ .. 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED THAT THERE 
ARE NO VERBAL ARRANGEMENTS IN RELATION TO 
THIS CONTRACT. 
24 .Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
By Mr. O'Connor: 
Q. Have von the original Y 
A. I have not. The sale was made· and settled in Brooks 
& Richardson's office. The orig·inal contract was kept in the 
office of the agents making the settlement. 
Mr. 0 'Connor: Just read to the jury that contract. 
NOTE: Witness here read ''Ex. Rogers 1-A' '. 
page 17 ~ Witness: That $10,000.00, I don't know whether 
it is in the original contract. That is a matter 
agTeed to by ].{r. Brooks and me on the telephone. · 
Q. You mean that is the basis on which commissions were 
chargedf 
A. That is the commissions we agreed upon. 
Q. In whose office was that contract drawn f 
A. Office of Brooks & Richardson. 
Q. Is that also the office of the Linbrook Realty Corpora-
tion? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Was that deal closed afterwards 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And settlement made Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can you tell us what the Linbrook Realty Corpora-
tion did with the property after they got it? 
Mr. Hazelgrove: Vv e object. There is no evidence that 
they ever got it yet. 
The Court: Yon haven't shown the fact that the Linbrook 
people ever had that property. 
page 18 ~ By ].{r. O'Connor: 
Q. Was there a deed drawn conveying that 
property to the Lin brook ~ealty Corporation or anyone else 1 
A. Drawn to Mr. Simon Enksuzian at the request of Mr. 
Saunders Brooks. 
Q. How was that request made f 
A. Just before the deeds had to be drawn, the settlement 
being required on June 22nd (it was sometime probably about 
the 18th or 19th of June) he called me up and told me that they 
had sold the property and asked me if I would not deed the 
property direct to their purchaser, 1\fr. Simon Euksuzian. 
He spelled the name over the telephone to me. I never heard 
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it before. To accommodate him I told him yes, I would do 
that. That is done often to &ave recordation fees. 
Q. Have you ever released or discharged the Linbrook 
Realty Corporation from liability under that contract? 
1\{r. Hazelgrove: I object. 
The Court: Objection sustained. That is a matter of law. 
By Mr. 0 'Connor: 
Q. Have you ever told them that you released or discharged 
them? 
A.. No, sir, I have not. 
page 19 r 1vfr. Hazelgrove: Objected to as immaterial. 
'rhe Court: Objection overruled as to what he 
told them but as to whether he has by his acts is a question 
of law for the court 
By Mr. 0 'Connor: 
Q. Did the Linhrook Realty Corporation ever request that 
you release or discharge them? 
A.. No, sir. 
Q. That contract is dated June 12th, 1928, I believe Y 
A. That is right. -
Q. How long after that did tlw· dP.ed pass Y 
A. I think the deed was dated sometime about the 19th of 
June-the 19th of June I think. 
Q. Were you acquainted 'vith this man, Euksuzian at the 
time you drew the deed or before? 
A. Not at all. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: 'Ve object as being immaterial. 
The Court: l-Ie already said he spelled the name over the 
telephone; he never saw the name before. 
By Mr. 0 'Connor: 
Q. Was this deed of trust for $6,500 paid 1 
A. It was not. 
page 20 r . EXI-IIBIT ROGERS #2. 
THIS DEED, made this 22nd day of June, in the year 
1928, between Pell S. Rogers and Grace A. Rogers, his wife, 
parties of the first part, and Simon Euksuzian, party of the 
second part, all of the City of Richmond, Virginia. 
26 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the 
sum of Ten ($10.00) Dollars, and other Good and valuable 
considerations, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the 
said parties of the first part, do grant and convey, WITH 
GENER.AL WARRANTY, unto the said party of the second 
part, the following described property, to-wit: 
All that certain lot, piece or parcel of land, lying and being 
in the City of Richmond, ~irginia, and known as No. 1817 
Hull Street, fronting Thirty (30') Feet, on the northern line 
of Hull Street, beginning at the line of the lot formerly 
owned by E. T. Bass and fronting towards Cowardin Ave- · 
nue, and running· back between parallel .lines One Hundred 
and Ninety-three and Twenty-two One-Hundredths (193.22') 
Feet, to an alley, and further described as commencing about 
One Hundred and Eighty-three and Forty-eight One-Hun-
dredths (183.48) Feet, from Cowardin Ave-nue, and fronting 
Thirty (30') Feet on Hull Street towards 19th Street, and 
running back between parallel lines One Hundred and Ninety-
three and Twenty-two One-Hudredths (193.22') Feet to an 
alley. Reference is made to a map in D. B. 18, page 410, and 
Plat Book 1, page 20. 
Being. the same real estate that was conveyed to the said 
Pell S. Rogers by deed from W. P. Varnier dated Mt~.rch 12th, 
·1928, and recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Hustings Court, 
Part II, of the City of Richmond, Virginia, in D. B. 65-
page 373. 
This conveyance is made subject to a certain deed of tru,st, 
dated J\!Iarch 23, 1926, from W. P. Variner and wife to Law-
rence P. Pool, Trustee, given to secure the principal sum of_ 
$8700.00 on this and other property, which said amount has 
been paid down to $6500.00 and has been renewed for one 
year from l\llarch 23, 1928, and is now only against this above 
described property. · 
. The said parties of the first part covenant that they have 
the right to convey the said land to the grantee, that they 
have done no act to encumber the said land, except as above 
recited, that the grantee shall have quiet possession of the 
said land, free from all encumbrances, except as above re-
yited, and that they, the said parties of the first part, will 
execute such further assurances of the said land 
page 21 ~ may be requisite. 
Witness ·the f<?llowing signatures and seals: 
PELL S. ROGERS 
GRACE· A. ROGERS 
·(Seal) 
(Seal) 
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State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
I, G. R. Olmstead, a Notary Public for the City aforesaid, 
in the State of Virginia, do certify that Pell S. Rogers and . 
Grace A. Rogers, his wife, whose names are signed to the 
foregoing writing, bearing date on the 22nd day of June, 
1928, have acknowledged the same before me in my City 
aforesaid. 
Given under my hand this 3rd day of July, 1928. 
G. R. OLMSTEAD, 
Notary Public. 
My Commission expires October 1st, 1928. 
State of Virginia, 
City of ,RichiD:ond, to-wit: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Hustings Court, Part TI, of 
'Said city, the 31st day of August, 1928. This deed ~as pre-
sented, and with the certificate annexed admitted to record 
at 11.45 o'clock A. M. · 
Teste: W. E. DuVAL, •Clerk, 
By A .. I. DuVAL D. C .. 
#126 
Pell S. Rogers & Grace A. Rogers his wife 
To 
Simon Euksuzian 
Deed of B. & S. 
August 31, 1928. 
Presented in office, and with certificate admitted to record 
at 11.45 o'clock A. M. 
Recorded in Deed-Book Vol 66-A, page 541 and Exd. 
Rogers, Smith ·and Heslep 
Real Estate, Loans and Insurance, 
Richmond, Va. 
28 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia .. 
Tax. . . ........................................ $14.40 
Fee .............................................. $ 1.50 
Transfer . . . . .................•.................. $ 1.00 
Paid $16.90 
page 22 ~ Q. What happened? Just tell the jury what 
transpired. · 
A. In the. deed of bargain and sale to Mr. Euksuzian from 
me and my wife it especially stated in the· deed the due date 
of the $6,500.00. 
Q. What is the name you give in that deed and from whom 'l 
A. From Pell S. Rogers and wife. 
The Conr:t : Where is the deed 1 That is the best evidence. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: Here it is. 
By Mr. O'Connor: 
Q. Is this the deed that you are referring tot 
A. Yes, sir, this is the deed. 
Q. What is the date of itY 
A. June 2.2, 1928. 
Mr. 0 'C'onnor: We off~r it in evidence. 
NOTE: Paper filed and marked ''Ex. Rogers #2.'' 
Mr. Hazelgrove: We wish to renew our motion to strike 
out the evidence about the contracts and exclude the con-
tracts from consideration of the jury. The deed has been put 
in evidence. 
page 23 ~ NOTE: The jury 'vere sent from the courtroom. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: Our motion to exclude this evidence is 
based upon the case of Woodson vs. Smith, 128 Va. 652. Our 
motion to exclude is based upon the ground that the deed 
merged all prior contracts, both oral and written, and is the 
sole instrument to which the parties may now look for their 
legal rights. 
The Court: rrhe court rules at this time that with the testi-
mony before it the original transaction arose between Pell 
S. Rogers and wife and the defendant, Linbrook Corpora-
tion, through its agents, and that, at the request of the de-
fendant, who stated that they had already sold the prop-
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Rogers and wife to the second purchaser of this property; 
and the court overrules the motion. 
Mr. Ha.zelgrove: We except for the reasons stated. 
NOTE : 'fhe jury returned to the courtroom. 
page 24 ~By Mr. O'Connor: 
Q. J\.'Ir. Rogers, I believe you stated that there 
was a default and· sale under this deed of trust~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the result as to whet4er there was any defi-
ciency or not? 
A. I was informed by-
Mr. Hazelg-rove: We object to any reference to the deed of 
trust. 
A. (Continued) I received a letter-
1\ir. Hazelgrove: We object to any reference to the deed 
of trust unless it is placed in evidence. 
The Court: The deed of trust will not show what the de-
ficiency was. There had to be a sale under the deed of trust 
and a report of the Trustee as to what the property brought 
in order to ascertain the deficiency. The question to this 
witness is, what was the deficit; 'vas the property sold~ He 
has already testified it was. Now what was the deficiency 
after paying charges and 'vhat did the property bring and 
what was the net that went back to the orginal vendor? 
page 25 ~ EX. ROGERS #3. 
Trustee Account of Sale by Lawrence P. Pool Trustee un-
der deed of \V. P .. Variner and wife of ~larch 22 1926 re- . 
corded in D. B. 61 B. p. 431 of the Clerk's Office of Hustings 
Court Part II of the City of Richmond. 
1929-
May 22 To sale of house and lot No. 1817 Hull 
Street aud as described in the deed of trust to 
W. P. Variner 
~iay 31 J. W. ~loore Auctioneer fee for 
of sale property . $10.00 
June 1 Times Dispatch Advertisement 




30 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
J\'Iay 27 City Taxes half of 1928 and in-
terest $73.85 
lYiay 31 W. P. Variner prorata. taxes of 
1929 to day of sale $56.05 
Deed B & S $5.50 $306.00 
Trustees Commissions 300.50 
Commissioner and Clerk's fees 
for auditing 'and recording Ac:... 
count of Trustee 3.50 
Balance credited on note of $.700 
secured by the deed and held by 
Mechanics and 1\tierchants Bank 





We cr. $5,535.92 on Note of W. P. Varnier 





J. B. HANCOCK, Cashier. 
The foregoing account of sale of Lawrence P. Pool, Trus-
tee, under deed from .w. P. Varnier and wife, was this day 
received, examined and approv·ed by me, th~ same being sup-
ported by satisfactory vouchers. 
Given under my hand this the 5th day of September, 1929. 
WILLIS C. PULLIAM, 
Commissioner of Accounts of the Hustings 
Court, Part II, Richmond,· Virginia. 
State of :Virg·inia, 
City of Richmond-t6-wit: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Hustings Court, Part II, of 
said city, the 16th day of January, 1930. This Account of sale 
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was presented, and with the certifi~ate annexed, admitted to 
record at 11.50 o'clock A. M. 
Teste: W. E. DuVAL, Clerk. 
By H. G. DuVAL, D. C. 
#56 
La,vrence P. Pool Trustee 
To 
W. P. Varnier & wife 
Account of ~ale 
16th day of January,. 1930. 
Presented in office and with the certificate admitted to 
t·ecord at 11.55 A. M. 
Recorded. in D. B. 68-B, page 382 & Exd 
Fee $1.00 paid 
page 26 ~ By Mr. O'Connor: 
- Q. I hand you here ;;tn ·account sales by Law-
rence P. Pool, dated Sept. 5, 1929, and ask you to introduce 
that as part of your ev~dence marked, "Ex. Rogers #3. n 
Mr. Williams: That paper belongs in your Clerk's Office. 
I will have to withdraw that with Your Honor's permission. 
NOTE : Paper withdrawn, copy to be filed and marked, 
"Ex. Rogers # 3." 
A. This is the account of sale by La-wrence P. Pool, Trus-
tee under deed of trust to W. P. Variner and wife of March 
22, 1926. 
Q. Is that the same deed of trust that is mentioned in the 
contract in evidence here of $6,500? 
A. Yes, sir. The property brought at auction $6,010.00 and 
was bought in by W. P. Varnier. 
Q. There are other charges on there. Just tell the jury 
what the deficit balance was. 
A. The balance was $1029.08 with interest from May 22, 
1929. 
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. page 27 ~ EX. ROGERS #4. 
Statement 
Brooks & Richardson 
Incorporated 
Real Estate & Insurance 
Mortgage Loans 
118 North Eighth Street 
Richmond, ~Va. 
June 22nd 1928 
Linbrook Realty Corpn, Seiler 
to-Statement of Exchange 
Pell S. Rogers, purchasers 
Purchase price 320 N Cleveland St. 
First Trusts 1817 Hull St 
Interest P /R $15000--6/22-/7/21/8 
Insurance P /R on 320 N Cleveland 
$ 2500.00 3 yrs. $ 30.00 Pm Exp 2/12/30 
17500.00 '' 210.00 '' '' 7/15/28 
17500.00 '' 210.00 '' '' 7/15/31 
Taxes P /R Cleveland St. $376.05 6/22-7/1/8 
Preparing Deed of Trust 
Sales Comms. Hull St. 
Recording deed B /S 




Sale Price 1817 Hull St 16,000.00 
First Trusts 302 No. Cleveland 15,000.00 
Second Trusts 302 No. Cleveland 1,500.00 
Interest P /R· Hull St. $6500-6./22/-9/23 98.50 
Insurance Hull St. $6500-3Y rs. 6/27/31 195.00 
Taxes P /R Hull St $134.60 622-7/1 2.99 
Credit to Purchaser 
. Cash due by Pell S. Rogers 
Deduct credit due Agt from above 
Preparing deed B /S 
Sales Commission 
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REALTORS 
page 28 ~ Q. vVere you sued for this deficit in this court Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. W a.s that amount of judgment obtained against you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, Mr. Rogers, I have here a statement on Brooks & 
Richardson's billhead, dated June 22, 1928, and ask you if 
this is a statement of the settlement between you on those 
properties. 
A. Yes, sir, this· is the statement rendered me by Brooks 
& Richardson for settlement of exchanging properties be-
tween Linbrook Realty Corporation-settlement of the ex-
c.hange. 
NOTE: Paper identified by witness is here filed and 
mar ked ''Ex. Rogers #4. '' 
Q. The second contract in evidence, I believe, is No. 1-B, 
introduced by you, in which the Linbrook Corporation agrees 
to convey to you certain properties. Were those properties 
conveyed by Lin brook to you f 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 29 ~ EX. ROGERS #5. 
THIS DEED, made this 19th day of June in the yea1· 
nineteen hundred and twenty-eight, between Linbrook Realt"J 
Corporation, a. Corporation organized and existing under 
the laws of the State of Virginia, party of the first part, and 
Pell S. Rogers party of the second part, 
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of tbe 
sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable considera-
tions, the said party of the first part doth grant and convey 
unto the said party of the second part· with General War-
ranty, all the certain lot, piece or parcel of land with all the 
improcements thereon, known as No. 302 North Cleveland 
Street, lying and being in the City of Richmond, Virg·inia, 
bounded and described as follows to-wit: 
COMMEN·CING at a point on the 'vest line of Cleveland 
Street distant fifty and eleven hundredths ( 50.11) feet north 
of the north line of Hanover Avenue, and at the center of 
an alley in common; thence running north,vardly along· and 
fronting on the said west line of Clev.eland Street forty-nine 
• 
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and fifty-five hundredths ( 49.55) feet to the center of an alley 
in common; and from said front extending back westwardly 
and between parallel line.s, fifty.:two (52) ·feet to a court six 
(6) feet wide; as shown on a plat made by Cha~. H. Fleet, 
dated January 24th, 125, and reco.rded in the Clerk's Office of 
the Richmond Chanc.ery oQourt in Deed Book 316-C, page 460. 
BEING the same real estate which was conveyed to Lin-
brook Realty Corporation .by J. A. Mebane and Bessie N., 
his wife, by de.ed bearing date December 1, 1927, and recorded 
in the Clerk's Office of Richmond Chancery Court in Deed 
Book 348-B, page 482. 
THIS Property is sold subject to a deed of trust for the 
principal sum of $15,000.00, recorded in the aforesaid Clerk's 
Office, and which is assumed by the party of the second part. 
The said party of the first part covenants that it has the 
right to convey the said land to the grantee; that it has done 
no act to encumber the said land; except as stated above that 
the grantee shall quiet possession of the said land, free from 
all encumbrances except as stated above, and that it will 
execute such further assurance of the. said la.Iid as may be 
requisite. 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, the party of the first part 
has caused its name to be signed hereto by Saunders M. 
Brooks, its President, and its corporate seal hereto 
page 30 r affixed, attested by C. E. Richardson, Jr., its Sec-
retary, this, the day and year first above written. 
LINBROOK REALTY CORPORATION 
SAUNDERS M. BROOKS President 
· (Corporate seal of 
Linbrook Realty Corporation 
Richmond, :V a.) 
Attest: C. E. RICHARDSON Jr. Secretary. 
State of Virginia. 
City of Richmond, To-Wit: 
I, L. Meredith Powers, a Notary Public for the city afore-
said, in the State of Virginia, do certify that Saunders M. 
Brooks and C. E. Richardson, Jr., President and Secretary, 
respectively, of Linbrook Realty Corporation whose names 
are signed to the within writing, bearing date on the 19th day 
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of June, 1928, have acknowledged the same before me in my 
city aforesaid. 
Given under my hand this 6th day of July, 1928. 
My commission expires April 20, 1931. 
L. :M:EREDITH POWERS N. P. 
City of Richmond-to-wit: 
In the Office of the Court of Chancery for said City, the 
23rd day of July, 1928, This deed was presented, and with 
the Certificate annexed; admitted to record at 2.25 o'clock 
P.M. 
Teste: CHAS. 0. SA VILLE Clerk. 
749 
Linbrook Realty Corp. 
To 
Pell S. Rogers 
Deed of Bargain and Sale 
Jul 23 1928 
Presented' in Office, and with certificate, admitted to r* 
ord, at 2.25 o'clock P.M. 
------ Clerk. 
Court of 
Recorded Deed Book, 354-A. 
Page 432 and ~xamined. 
$22,000.00 
Brooks & Richardson, Ine. 
Realtors 
14 N. 8th St .. 
Richmond, Virginia. 








page 31 t Q. Did you assume payment of the mortgages 
on those properties described in that contract Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you the deed Y 
A. Y·es, sir. 
Mr. 0 'Connor: I ask you to introduce it as part of your 
testimony, marked "Ex. Rogers #5''. 
NOTE: Paper filed and marked ''Ex. Rogers #5". 
Q. On that statement showing settlement is this $6,500.00 
deed of trust mentioned there Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How is it shown Y 
A. It is shown as a charge against me. It is a charge in 
the way they have that statement made. They charge me with 
the $26,000.00--charge me with the deed of trust and credit 
me with the whole thing~ 
Q. Is it charged in the same way on that statement that the 
deeds of trust on the other property are charged that you 
assumed? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On this statement (I ask you to look at it 
page 32 t again) tell us whether the item appears on the 
charged side. 
A. It looks to me from that statement that they charged me 
$6,_500.00. It is in the same column with the charge of $26,-
000.00 for the Cleveland Street property. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 1\fr. Hazelgr~ve: · 
Q. Mr. Rogers, who owned those notes secured by this deed -
of trust? 
A. They 'vere· held by the Mechanics & Merchants Bank, 
either for themselves or some client. That is where the loan 
was placed. 
Q. Weren't they owned by ~fr. W. P. Varnier and held as 
collateral by the bank for his obligation? Do you knowT 
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A. No, I do not know who owned them. 
Q. Mr. Varnier obtained judgment against you m this 
court! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On the 20th day of January, 1930; is .that correct Y 
A. That is right. 
Q. Have you paid that judgment? 
A. Not yet. 
Q. Have you paid anything on that deed of trust 
page 33 r at all since the property was conveyed by you y 
A. No, I have not. I paid the interest notes, 
advanced to the account of ~ir. Euksuz,ian. 
Q. It is your contention here that the Linbrook Realty 
Corporation contracted to assume the payment of that deed 
of trust? · · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you had previously contracted to assume payment 
of it¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And neither one of you have paid anything on it; is 
that right? 
A. Not that I kno'v of. I have not. 
~{r. Hazolgrove: At this point I want to move to strike out 
the evidence again. · 
The Court: Let's get a little further and let's get the whole 
situation. 
By ~ir. I-Iazelgrove: 
Q. Mr. Uogers, when did ~Ir. Saunders Brooks call you up 
about the resale of the property to Mr. Euksuzian? 
A. It was a day or two before the deed was 
page 34 }- written. I immediately ·wrote the deed after that. 
Q. Isn't it a fact that he called you up, or is it 
a fact that he called you up before your proposition? 
A. No,. sir, he did not. 
Q. Isn't it a. fact. that you signed the two contracts intro-
duced as "Exs. Rogers 1-A and 1-R'' prior to the Linbrook 
Corporation signing them t 
A. They signed them first. Tlie offer was brought to me. 
Q. They were after you to sell or exchange Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were not after them Y 
A. That is right. 
Q. What did Mr. Brooks tell you when he called you, Mr. 
Rogers? 
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Witness : When he asked me to convey to Euksuzian 7 
Mr. Hazelgrove: Yes. 
A. He asked if I 'vould not convey it to Mr. Euksuzian, 
and he spelt the name over the 'phone to me. I told him 
that I would do it to accommodate him, but I would not re-
lease him from his obligation of assumption under the con-
tract in this deal. I just deeded to Euksuzian sub-
page 35 ~ ject to the contract. 
Q~ You told him that Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Over the telephone? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That question had arisen at that time 7 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Who brought that up Y 
A. Mr. Brooks just told me over the telephone that he had 
sold the property to 1\{r. Euksuzian and asked if I would not 
deed it directly to Euksuzian. 
Q. You told him what? 
A. I told him I would do it. It is done often. It is a regu-
lar custom to do it to save recordation fees. I told him the 
contract was with him; I did not know Mr. Euksuzian at all. 
Q. That you would do what 7 
A. I would deed the property to Euksuzian subject to the 
deed of trust. · 
Q. You told him you would do that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Didn't he tell you Euksuzian was to assume 
page 36 ~ the deed of trustY 
A. No, I don't think he did. 
Q. Are you sure Y 
A. Well, I don't recall he did. I told him I would deed 
it to Euksuzian just to save the deed of trust. 
Q. When did you first find out the deed was only made 
subject to the deed of trustY 
A. Knew it all the time. 
Q. Knew it all the time f 
A. Yes, sir .. 
Q. Didn't you testify before the Virginia Real Estate Com-
mission on the 27th day of June, 1929, as follows (I read 
from page 38 of the official record of the Commissioner) : 
· "Mr. Brooks asked me if I would deed the property direct 
to Euksuzian, which I did. I put in the deed, as I do in all 
deeds, that the purchaser assumed the deed of trust.'' 
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Didn't you say that Y 
A.. If I did, it is a mistake. I should have said subject to 
it. 
Q. Didn't you say it f 
A. 1\{aybe · I did if it is in the record. I could 
page 37 ~ have been mistaken at that time. 
Q. Of course, you were. Weren't you then un-
der the impression Euksuzian had assumed the deed of trust 7 
A. I probably was. · 
Q. Didn't 1\-ir. Brooks tell you he had assumed it 1 
A. No, sir. Mr. Brooks didn't talk to me about that part 
at all. 
Q. You talked to him, but he d.idn 't talk to you 7 
A. Yes, he talked to me, and I talked to him. He didn't . 
say anything about that. I told him I 'vould deed it to Euksu-
zian to save tl1e deed of trust. 
Q. He didn't say a thing! 
A. He told me then h~ was taking back a second deed of 
trust for $3,500.00 on the property from Mr. Euksuzian. 
Q. Yet, when you testified oefore the Real Estate Commis .. 
sion on the date I have named, you thought you had conveyed 
it and that Euksuzian assumed the deed of trustY 
A. I said I may have been mistaken at that time. 
Q. Your memory is clearer now? 
A. After looking over the deed-
Yr. 0 'Connor: The deed is in the record. 
page 38 } By Mr. Hazelgrove: 
Q. Didn't Mr. Brooks tell you on the telepbone 
l1e woul~ not take title to the Hull Street property? 
A. No, sir, he certainly did not; in fact, several contracts 
came to me and I refused the first one and made him a coun-
ter proposition, and afterwards he came back with this propo-
sition to me. If I had wanted to sell the property to Euksu-
-zian direct, I would have done so without accepting the trade 
. for the apartment house. 
Q. Didn't you accept Euksuzian as guarantee on that 
property? 
... f\.. I deeded the property to him at the request of Mr. 
nrooks. 
Q. Did you ask the Linbrook Corporation to execute the 
.deed evidencing this assumption of the mortgage? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you make any request of them at all! 
. A. No, sir, I did not, not to that extent. 
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Q. Did you ask him to give you any evidence whatsoever 
at the time the deal was closed that they were to remain lia-
ble on that mortgage Y 
A. I did not. I thought the contracts were sufficient for 
that. 
Q. Ever have a. case like this before Y 
page 39 ~ A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't know anything about it, did you 1 
A. I admit I didn't. 
Q. W ereu't you under the impression, prior to this matter 
coming up, that when you deeded property to a third person, 
you let the intermediate man out? 
A. No, sir, I 'vasn 't ·under tha.t impression, never have 
. been. 
Q. Had you ever thought of it at all t 
A. Yes, sir, I had thought of it, have done it many a time. 
Others have done the same thing for me. 
Q. You were pretty anxious to get a settlement of the sale 
of that Hull Street property, weren't you Y 
·A. Didn't seem so; I didn't get it, until the latter part of 
July. 
Q. You put up part of the money to make it, didn't you! 
A. I didn't put up the money. Brooks & Richardson put 
rip the money to me. 
Q. Didn't you testify on the date I have mentioned before 
the Real Estate Commission as follows: 
page 40 ~ "He told me (speaking· of Mr. Brooks) that Mr. 
Ediss had an interest in it, and in order to get it 
settled and to straighten matters out, although Mr. Ediss 
owed me considerable money on the books, I did advance two 
or three hundred dollars to lVIr. Ediss to get a settlement of 
the resale of the Hull Street property." 
Did you· testify to that f 
A. I testified to that. 'rhe deeds were drawn and I wanted 
my settlement. Mr. Brooks asked me to wait until Mr. Euk-
suzian settl~d. I told him I had absolutely nothing to do with 
the sale to Euksuzian; I wanted settlement. Mr .. Brooks' 
excuse was that in the event Euksuzian did not settle, we 
'vould have to draw the deed over again to them; they would 
have to take title to it, and he told me that }Jr. Smith and Mr. 
Ediss had entered into a proposition with Mr. Euksu-
zian to either take one-third or help him out on his 
payments on it; something happened and he could not get 
his cash money. Mr. Brooks told me he was going to put up 
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Mr. Smith's part for him; he 'vas his salesman, worked un-
der him, and as Mr. Edis worked for the Rogers Realty Cor-
poration, and we were interested in the commis-
page 41 r missions and Brooks & Richardson were inter-
ested in the commissions, he thought I ought to 
put up Ediss' part, and that was put up by deducting from 
my settlement; it came out of me-Ediss' commission. 
Q. J\IIr. Rogers, how long was this deed of trust for $6500.00 
in default prior to the sale 0/ 
A. The deed of trust, as I recall, was due on the· 27th of 
lVIarch, 1929. 
Q. When was the sale T 
A. The sale was made (it shows here) May 22nd. 
Q. During that tim.e did you make any request of the Lin-
brook Realty Corporation that they pay up that mortgage 
and save you harmless 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did they deny their liability? 
. A. No, sir. 
Q. Why did you make that request? Did you think you 
·were liable .on it 1 
A. It 'vas a matter of information to him. Yes, I was lia-
ble to ~{r. V arnier. 
page 42 r Q. you knew you were liable? 
· A. To 1\fr. Varnier. 
Q. Wasn't any doubt about that~ 
A. I thought I \\ras. The deed to me was subject to that 
deed of trust. I thought I was liable. I called l\1r. Brooks 
and he tole me he had arranged with the bank to take care 
of it. I told him to be careful ; the property was advertised 
for sale, because l1e had written me and called me up once or 
twice about it. 
Q. You were interested because you knew you were liable 
under the deed of trust~ 
A. Certainly, I was interested to that extent. 
Q. That was your impression, when the deed said, ''sub-
ject to" and the contract said ''assumed", that you remained 
liable? 
A. There was a deed of trust on the property I got from 
Mr. ~Varnier, and the contract calls for an assumption. 
Q. So you thought you were liable . for it Y 
A. I don't know. I didn't think very much about it. 
Q. Didn't you think enough about it do defend the suit 
brought by Varnier, to which your attorneys :filed as grounds 
of defense the following: 
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page 43 ~ "For answer to the plaintiff's cail for grounds 
of defense, defendant comes and says that he did 
not promise and undertake in the manner and form set out 
in the plaintiff's notice of motion for judgment; that he· did 
not assume personally to pay off and discharge the said deed 
of trust as alleged; that the contract sued upon is merged 
into the deed of bargain and sale subsequently executed by 
the parties, and that the defendant owes the plaintiff noth-
ing." 
A. I didn't write it. My attorney wrote it. 
Q. You didn't object to it Y 
A. I don't know ·whether I ever saw it. 
Q. Didn't you hear it read before the trial Y 
A. That is right. 
Q. Did you object to itf 
Mr. Williams: If Your Honor· please-
Mr. Hazelgrove : I asked him if he heard it read. 
The Court: Then asked him if he objected to it. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: I mean did you object to your counsel 
filing s·uch g-rounds of defense. 
page 44 ~ · EX. ROGERS #6 .. 
Notice Of judgment Lien. 
To: 
The Linbrook Realty Corporation 
Please Take Notice As Follows ; 
Judgment was obtained on the 20th day ·of January, 1930, 
in The Hustings Court Part II, of the City of Richmond, 
Virginia, by vV. P. Varnier, Plaintiff, against Pell S. Rogers, 
defendant, for the sum of $1,029.08, with interest thereon 
from the 22nd day of 1\fa.y, 1919, until paid, and $12.00 costs. 
Execution was issued on said judgment on the 11th "day of 
April, 1930, returnable on June lOth, 1930. 
Said execution was placed in the hands of the Sergeant of 
the Hustings Court Part II, of the City of Richmond, Vii·-
ginia, on the 11th day of April, 1930, at 11:00 o'clock A. M. 
Said execution is a lien under section 6501 of the Code of 
Virginia, of 1919, as amended by act approved March 22nd, 
1928, on all the personal estate of or to which said defend-
-- ---~-------
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ant is, or may afterwards and or on before the return day 
of said execution become possess·ed or entitled, except as is 
exempt under the provisions of said section. 
Respectfully, 
HERMAN A. COOPER, 
Attorney for W. P. :Varnier, Plaintiff. 
page 45 } The Court: I don ~t think that is proper. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. O'Connor: 
Q. If you had known that Mr. Euksuzian was willing to 
purchase this property at the ·price he paid the Linbrook Cor-
porat~on, would you have sold directly to him Y 
Mr. Hazelgrove: I object. 
The Court : Objection sustained. 
Witness stood aside. 
Mr. ·0 'Connor: I have here a c.opy of notice of judgment 
lien-
1\Ir. Hazelgrove: We will admit notice of judgment lien has 
been served on us. 
NOTE: Paper filed and marked as "Ex. Rogers #6" .. 
page 46 } The Court : I think possibly at this stage of the 
testimony of the plaintiff you can take up the 
proposition you advanced as to merger, or whether the con-
tract between the original parties prevails. I will let the jury 
go now until 2 o'clock. 
Mr. Hazelgrove : We reserve our motion to strike out 
plaintiff's evidence until the plaintiff announces that he bas 
closed. -
NOTE: At 1 P. 1\tL a recess was taken until 2 ·P. M .. 
page 47 } Alt,T·ERNOON SESSION. 
The court resumed its session at 2 o'clock P. M. 
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HERMAN COOPER, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly sworu, 
testified as follows : 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
_By Mr. Williams: 
Q. What is your occupation f 
A. Attorney-at-Law. 
Q. Yo1;1 were counsel for :Nir. Varnier when he secu;red judg'"" 
ment against Mr. Rogers in this matter in Jan nary f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why was it that you did not pursue your judgment to 
satisfaction¥ 
Mr. Hazelgrove: vVe object. 
The Court : Ask him whether the judgment has been sat-
isfied. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. Has the judgment been satisfied 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Why was it that you did not pursue it to 
page 48 ~ satisfaction t 
Mr. HazelgTove: We object. What his private reasons 
were for not our suing it I do not see ho'v it can be evidence. 
The Court: 'V e are just concerned in the fact that it has 
not been settled. The reasons why I don't think are applica-
ble. 
Mr. Williams: We note an exception. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By :Nir. Hazelgrove: 
Q. The defense was made in that suit that Mr. Rogers was 
not liable? 
A. That was filed in the grounds of ·defense. 
Q .. Wasn't that defense made at the trial Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Williams: . 
~. Wasn't that defense afterwards given up f 
A. Yes, sir. 
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. Q. A~d abandoned 7 
A. Yes, sir. We abandoned the case. Then-
page 49 ~ Q. I am talking about the defense for the defend-
ant, ]\lfr. Rogers. . 
A. We agreed Rogers was responsible, and we further 
agreed that Euksuzian was responsible-
1 ~{r. Hazelgrove: I object. 
The Court: Don't state the agreement. You can state the 
facts, that the case went on and judgment was obtained. 
Witness: Yes, sir. 
Witness stood aside. 
Plaintiff Rests. 
page 50 ~ The Court: Have you gentlemen any authori-
. ties on the question brought up? 
Mr. Ha.zelgrove: I found none applicable to this precise 
.stat of affairs except as to negotiable instruments. 
The Court: All right, gentlemen. The plaintiff is through Y 
lvfr. Williams : Yes, sir. 
The Court: The motions made by counsel for defendant 
are overruled. 
1\tlr. I-Iazelgrove: I don't know that my motion is in at the 
conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, but I wish to make it plain 
on the record that we move to exclude all the plaintiff's evi-
dence for the reasons heretofore stated. 
The Court: Which motion is overruled. 
1\tfr. Hazel g-rove: And we except. 
page 51 } SAUNDERS 1\tl. BROOI{S, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAl\liNArriON IN CHIEF. 
By 1\tlr. Hazelgrove: 
Q. Are you an officer of the Lin brook Realty Corporation f 
A. President. 
Q. Did your corporation own the property No. 302 N. 
Cleveland A venue~ 
A. It did. 
Q. Did or did you not seek out Mr. Rogers' company to 
make a trade for Hull Street property? 
A. We were offered a proposition from Mr. Rogers for a 
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trade of the Cleveland Street property-for Hull Street pr'llp-
erty. The contract was broug·ht into our office by one of our 
salesmen, Mr. Smith, who was working with Mr. Ediss, who 
·was salesman for Mr. Rogers. Before I would sign any pa-
pers I called for J\~Ir. Rogers on the telephone-
Q. ~Iay I interrupt you? Had the contracts, when they 
were brought to you, been signed by Mr. R.ogers? 
·A. Yes. 
Q. I wish to introduce at this point originals 
page 54 ~ of the two contracts and ask you if they are the 
originals Y If so, will you please file them as part 
of your evidence Y 
A. Yes, sir, they are the original contracts. 
NOTE: Papers filed and marked ''Exs. Brooks No. 1 
and 2". 
page 52} EX. BROOKS NO. l. 
Brooks & Richardson, Inc. 
Realtors 
118 North Eighth Street 
Richmond, V a. 
I hereby agree to give Sixteen Thousand Dollars ($16,-
000.00), payable $9500.00 Cash and assume 1st Trust of 
$6500 for the following property: # 1817 Hull St. Richmond, 
Va. Store & Flat above 
Subject to Contract attached. 
provided the title is. free from valid objections; (subject to 
any restrictions now on the property), to be settled for at 
the office of Brooks & Richardson, Ine., Agents, on -or before 
June 22-1928 or as soon thereafter as title can be examined 
.and papers prepared, allowing a reasonable time to correct 
any objections reported by the Title E·xaminer. Actual pos-
session of premises subject to lease of present tenant. 
Taxes, interest, insurance and rents to be prorated as of day 
of settlement. 
I hereby make a deposit of $10.00 to bind this contract; 
which is to be applied on purchase price; or refunded if title 
is not good or this offer not accepted within 3 days. 
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Witness the following signatures and seals at Richmond, 
Va., this 12 day of June, 1928. . 
LINBROOI( REALTY CORP 
By SAUNDERS ~L BROOKS 
Address. . . . . .................. · .. 
Examiner. . . . . ................. . 
I hereby accept the above offer, and agree to pay Brooks & 
Richardson, Inc., Agents, regular Commission, as per tariff 
()f the R.ichmond Real Estate Exchange. 
PELL S. ROGERS (Seal) 
(Seal) 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED THAT TH·ERE 
ARE NO VERBAL ARRANGEMENTS IN RELATION 
'rO THIS CONTRACT'. 
page 53} EX. BROOKS #2. 
Brooks & Richardson, Inc. 
Realtors 
118 North Eighth Street 
Richmond, Va. 
I hereby agree to give Twenty Six Thousand dollars ($26,-
·000.00), payable $9500.00 Cash and assume 1st Trust of 
$15000.00 and give 2nd mortgage $1500.00 payable $500.00 
per year for a period of 3 years, for the following property: 
202 No Cleveland St, Richmond, Va, 6 Apt Building 
Subject to Contract attached. 
provided the title is free from valid objections; (subject to 
any restrictions no'v on the property), to be settled for at 
the office of Brooks & Richardson, Inc:, Agents, on or before 
.June 22 1928 or as soon thereafter as title can be examined 
and papers prepared, allowing a reasonable time to correct 
any objections reported by the Title Examiner. Actual pos-
session of premises subject to lease of present tenant. Taxes, 
interest, insurance and rents to be prorated as of day of set-
tlement. 
I hereby make a deposit of $10.00 to bind this contract; 
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which is to be applied on purchase price; or refunded if title 
is not good or this offer not accepted within 3 days. 
Witness the following signatures and seals at Richmond, 
Va., this 12 day of June, 1928. 
PELL S. ROGERS 
I hereby acept the above offer, and agree to pay Brooks & 
Richardson, Inc., Agents, regular Commission, as per tariff 
of the Richmond Real Estate Exchange. 
LINBROOI{ REATLY COR.P 
By SAUNDERS N. BROOKS 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
Address ....................... · .. 
Examiner ...................... . 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED THAT THERE 
ARE NO VERBAL ARRANGE:NIENTS IN RELATION 
TO THIS CONTRACT. 
Q. I believe you started to say you called 1\Ir. Rogers on 
the telephone. Will you please continue Y 
A. I called 1\Ir. Rogers and said to Mr. Rogers, ''It has 
been told to D':le that you thoroughly understand that we are 
not to take title to the Hull Street property; that we are 
taking back a Thirty-five hundred dollar second mortgage 
for our equity in the Cleveland Street property", and he 
was giving us back besides that a fifteen hundred dollar 
second mortg·age on the Cleveland Street property for our 
equity in that building. I said, ''Is it clearly understood 
Simon Euksuzian will take title to this property and is it 
satisfactory''? He said, yes that he was to take title to the 
property, the sixty-five hundred dollar deed of trust on the 
property to be assumed by 1\fr. Simon Euksuzian. 
page 55 ~ ~Ir. 0 '·Connor: We object to so much of the tes-
timony as is in conflict with or at variance with 
the written contracts introduced h~re between these parties 
as a:ffecti'ng 'vhether or not they assumed to pay that deed 
of trust. 
Mr. Hazelgrove : The answer to that is the Swayne case. 
We are showing the real consideration for the deed to Euksu-
zian, our position being the consideration was that Mr. Rog-
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ers got rid of the Hull Street property and acquired the 
Cleveland Street property. 
The Court: The objection is overruled. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: We except. 
By Mr. Hazelgrove: 
Q. Did you or did you not tell him that Mr. Euksuzian was 
to assume the deed of trust of $6,500.00? · 
A. Absolutely. 1\:Ir.- Euksuzian was to take the same posi-
tion as the I.Jinbrook Corporation, assuming the $6,500.00 
deed of trust. This deal was of as much advantage to Mr. 
Rogers as it was to the Linbrook Corporation. Both of us 
owned property which we were trying to get rid of. Mr. Rog-
ers received half of the commissions on that 
page 56 ~ property and Brooks & Richardson received 
half of the eommissions. The commissions were 
paid by the Linbrook Corporation and by ~1r. Pell S. Rog-
ers. 
Q. Did "l\{r. Rogers agree to Euksuzian assuming. the mort~ 
gage instead of the I.~inbrook Corporation 1 
A. Surely. He drew the deed conveying the property. 
That agreement was at a time before I signed my name to 
the contract. 
Q. Was the deal actually closed on that basis by the deed 
being made direct to Mr. Euksuzian Y 
A. Certainly. The deed speaks for itself. 
Q. Did lHr. Rogers accept settlement with the deal having 
been made 1n that way? 
A. He conveyed the property. 
Q. Did he accept the settlement statem.ent which you sent 
him? 
A. Surely. 
Q. Did you know whether ~lr. Euksuzian .. had assumed the 
deed of trust in the deed or not Y 
A. I did not, because I did not look at the deed. The deed 
·was handed to our settlement man, 1\{r. Wilkerson, in our 
office, who closed the transaction. 
page 57 ~ Q. Did l\1r. Rogers say to you when you called 
him up that it was all right to make the deed to 
Mr. Euksuzian, but you would have to underRtand the Lin-
brook Corporation would still be liable on the mortgage Y 
A. No. 
Q. Make any statement anything like that? 
A. No, sir. 
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CUOSS EXAMINATION. 
Uy ]\'lr. O'Connor: 
Q. This man in your office, that you say the deed was 
handed to, was your agent, wasn't heY 
A. Our settlement clerk, yes, sir. 
Q. The Linbrook Realty Corporation sold this Hull Street 
property to Euksuzian, didn't they Y 
A. There was an agreement entered into. 
Q. That was a written contract Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you that written contract? 
A. Our ·attorney has. 
page 59 ~ NOTE : Contract produced by ¥r. Hazelgrove. 
Q. Is this the contract f 
Mr. Hazelgrove : That copy was loaned to me by Mr. Alfred 
E. Cohen. May I supplement this for the original Y 
The Court : Yes, sir. 
A. This is the original. 
NOTE: Copy of contract. was filed and marked, "Ex. 
Brooks No. 3''. 
page 58~ EX. BROOI(S #3. 
Brooks & Richardson 
Incorporated 
I Hereby Agree To Give Ten Thousand, Five Hundred 
Dollars ($10,500.00), Payable Five Hundred Dollars cash. as-
sume 1st trust of $6500.00. due in 21!?. years, and a second 
trust of $3500.00 payable in 3 years for the following prop-
erty: # 1817 Hull St., Richmond, ~Va. Store and flat now rent-
ing for $70. per month. provided the title is free from valid 
objections; (subject to any restrictions now on the prop-
erty), to be settled for at the 'office of Brooks & Richardson, 
Inc., Agents, or or before July 20th, 19'28, or as soon there-
after as title can be examined and papers prepared, allow-
ing a reasonable time to correct any objections reported by 
the Title Examiner. Actual possession pf premises subject 
to lease of present tenant. Taxes, interest, insurance and 
rents to be pro-rated as of settlement. · 
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I hereby make a deposit of $10.00 to bind this contract; 
'vhich is to be applied on .purchase price; or refunded if title 
is not good or this offer not acepted within 3 days. 
Witness the foflowing signatures and seals at Richmond, 
V ft., this 12 day of J nne, 1928. 
(Signed) SIMON EUKSUZIAN 
Address ........................ . 
Examiner. . . . . ................. . 
I hereby accept the above offer, and agree to pay Brooks & 
Richardson, Inc., Agents, regula-r Commission, as per tariff 
of the R.ichmond Real Estate Exchange. 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED THAT THERE 
ARE NO VERBAL ARRANGEMENTS IN RELATION 
TO THIS CONTRACT. 
A true Copy 
Q. That contract 'vas drawn in your office? 
A. This contract was drawn by Mr. Smith on our station~ 
ary. Whether drawn in our office I could not answer that 
question, because I don't know. 
Q. Brooks & Richardson got commissions for the sale to 
Euksuzian? 
A. He was our salesman. 
Q. Mr. Smith was your salesman? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ife or someone else in your office drew the 
page 60 ~ contract? 
A. That is .correct. J\tir. Smith did. 
Q. He was your agent, wasn't he? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He drew it on your paperY 
A. Drew it on our stationery. That is correct. 
Q. In that contract referred to there, didn't you require 
Euksuzian to assume the $6,500.00 deed of trustY 
A. It doesn't say anything-
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·Mr. O'Connor: Read it and see. 
A. That is right. That it correct. In this paper it says,. 
''assume''. 
Q. ·You tell this jury that you did not assume it and that 
you told Mr. Rog·ers you were not assuming it and you re-
quired Mr. Euksuzian to assume it in this contract? 
A. This paper which was settled under is not signed by us. 
This is not a contract. It is a paper or agreement. 
By the Court : 
Q. Who was it signed by Y 
A. By Euksuzian, on one side, as to what he would do in 
regard to purchasing the property; but before we closed our 
deal with ~Ir. R.ogers I had. it thoroughly understood with 
1\tir. R.ogers that Euksuzian was to take title to that pro pert~. 
page 61 ~ By 1\IIr. 0 '.Connor: 
. Q. "\Vhat other agreement did you have with 
Tuksuzian besides that contract? 
A. None. 
Q. When you did convey to Euksuzian, or had Rogers do it, 
it was pursuant to that contract, was it 'not 7 
Mr. Hazelgrove: There is certain other litigation pending 
in this matter, in which the question of this contract has a 
good deal to do, and we ask that that be excluded. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
Mr. Hazelgrove : We note an exception. 
A. We closed the deal according to this paper, under the 
.agreement we had with Mr. Rogers, of course,- as I stated 
heretofore. 
By the Court: 
Q. Whose client was :Mr. Euksuzian, 1\tir. Rogers' or your 
client? 
A. I can't tell you the client of either one of us. It was 
.a proposition of Euksuzian to a salesman-
Q. Mr. Rogers has said that he never knew the 
page 62 ~ man at all, his named was spelled to him over the 
telephone. I want to know whether he wa.s a man 
secured by your agent or by somebody else. · 
A. This man 'vas gotten hold of by our salesman, through 
our salesman, and a man nam~d Ediss working for Mr. Pell 
Rogers-
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By Mr. Connor: 
Q. Was he working for Pell Rogers or the Rogers Realty 
Company? 
A. I don't know whether it was Pell Rogers at that time 
.or the Rogers Realty Corporation; I don't know exactly; 
but, anyway, those three gentlemen got together and they 
came to an agreement among themselves what to do with 
this piece of property. The Linbrook Corporation was not 
to take title to it. That is the reason we would not sign that 
paper. All we were to do was to accept a second mortgage 
on that property and $1,500.00 on the Cleveland .Street prop-
erty, for our equity in the Cleveland Street property. 
Q. Mr. Ediss is dead, isn't heY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did .you show to Mr. Rogers the contract you 
page 63 ~ handed to Euksuzian? 
A. I did not personally. 
Q. Did you know that any of your salesmen did? 
A. I could not swear that they did, because this was a 
transaction between his agent and our agent and Euksuzian. 
Q. As far as you know Mr. Rogers did not kno'v that you 
had sold the property to Euksuzian or what your contract 
with Euksuzian was? 
A. Why, certainly, he knew when I talked with him over 
the telephone. 
Q. But that was after you made the contract, wasn't it Y 
A. No, sir-the day that the contract 'vas brought to me in 
my office, the very day, and I stated to him over the telephone 
that I would not sign the paper from him unless. that would 
be understood and agreed. · 
Q. Let rnA ask you this: I am not talking about these con-
tracts; I am talking about that contract signed. by Eusuzian 
was signed .by Euksizian before, lYir. Rogers ever knew that 
you were selling it to him, or ever heard of him. 
A. The papers were signed the same day and if you "'ill 
go over the contracts you will find they are all dated the 
same day of this paper. 
Q. Just answer the question. What is your an-
page 64 ~ swer to the question Y 
A. The answer is that they were all simultan-
eous. lYir. Rogers' agent was working with Mr. Smith on it. 
Q. Will you tell the jury why the Linbrook. Corporation 
did not sign this contract? 
A. Certainly, I will. Gentlemen, we did not understand 
'· about how long the mortgage had to run on that property 
and what it was renting for. We were only interested in 
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what we could ·get for our Cleveland Street .property, there-
fore we would not sign that paper, not knowing the condition 
existing on the property, and not going to take title to it. 
That is the reason we did not sign it. . 
Q~ But your agent wrote this contract and recited a deed 
of trust of $6,500.00, due in two ai1d a half years; isn't that 
true? 
A. That is 'vhat is in that paper. 
Q. And you settled on that contract Y 
1V[r. Hazelgrove : I object. I don't see the relevancy of 
the question about two and a half years. 
The Court : Objection overruled. 
puge 65 ~ Mr. Hazelgrove : We note an exception. 
By ~ir. O'Connor: . 
Q. The property that you conveyed to Mr. Rogers in ex-
change for this Hull Street property had deeds of trust on 
it, didn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And they were assumed by Mr. Rogers, weren't they Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he has been paying these, hasn't he? 
A. He has, or whoever he conveyed the property to has 
taken care of them. 
Q. And you tell this jury that while he assumed them on 
the property he exchanged you didn't assume them on this 
property? 
A. I say that it was thoroughly understood bet"Teen Mr. 
Rogers and the Linbrook Realty Corporation that they were 
not to take title to this property; that Mr. Euksuzian was 
to take title to it and assme the $6,500.00 deed of trust and 
was to give us back a $3,500.00 deed of trust on it for a part 
.equity in our Cleveland Street property. Mr. Rogers gave 
us a $1,500.00 deed of trust. 
page 66 ~ Q. I don't quite understand what you mean. I 
'vant to ask you this question: Do you mean to 
say that you communicated to }lr. Rogers the fact that you 
did not consider you 'vere assuming, and would not assume, 
this deed of trustY 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. Now, in '~hat languag·e did you communicate that? 
A. As I have stated to you before. Mr. Euksuzian was to 
take title to the property; that we were not to take title to 
it, but he was to take title to it and give us back a $3,500.00 
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second deed of trust, and Mr. Rogers was to give us a $1,-
500.00 second mortgage for our equity in that building. 
Q. That is the whole conversation relating to that Y 
A. I think so. 
Q. About the time this property was advertised for sale 
,under this deed of trust, didn't you telll\{r. Euksuzian, 9r Mr. 
Rogers, or both, that you would take care of itt · 
A. I told them, if 1\{r. Euksuzian would pay what he· owed, 
.past due interest on the first mortgage, which information 
he furnished me with, and what he owed me ori the second , 
mortgage, that I would make him a loan, or take care of it 
for him. Yes, sir. 
Q. You did tell him you would take care of it 
;page 67 } provided he would pay what he owed on the seeond 
mortgage? 
A. If he paid everything he owed on the first and second 
mortgages, we would absolutely take care of it, yes, sir. 
Q. You didn't take care of it 7 
A. Because he didn't pay. . 
·Q. And this property was sold under deed of trust! 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Rogers you did not blame l1im if he did 
come back on you to collect this judgment 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Never made any such statement f 
A. No, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Sy· Mr. Hazelgrove: 
Q. Did you tell 1\'Ir. Rogers that Eusuzian was to assume 
pa:rment of the $6,500.00? 
A. Surely. 
Q. Did 1\'Ir. Rogers tell you when the property was to be 
foreclosed under the deed of trust? 
A. Heveral days before foreclosure I was talking 
page 68 } to him in our office trying to get all of them to-
gether and straighten the thing up to keep from 
having a foreclosure, and we could not get together, and that 
'vas the last T saw of Mr. Rogers until after the sale. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By ~Ir. O'Connor: 
Q. Didn't you tell 1\{r. Rogers you had made arrangements 
with the bank to take care of it 7 
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A. No; sir. I tolrl him I had talked with Mr. Hancock at 
the bank and asked him not to foreclose the property without 
his taking it up with me. 
Q. Did he do that! 
A. He did not get in touch with me personally but talked 
to my partner, Mr. Richardson. 
Q. When this deed in which Mr. Rogers conveyed the 
property to Euksuzian came into your office, do you mean for 
this jury to understand you never sa·w it before it was de-
.. livered to Euksuzian Y 
A. I did not. 
Q. You did not see it f 
A. No, sir. 
page 69 ~ Q. Anybody in your office see it f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who? 
A. ~Ir. Ed. Richardson. 
Q. Didn't ~Ir. Rogers give you that deed personally! 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't know what that deed contained Y 
_ A. I told you I did not. 
Q. You did notY 
A. I did not. _ 
Q. The deed conveyed property in which you wer~ inter-
. ested and you did not know what was conveyed? ·You were 
interested in it, 'veren 't you f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were not enough interested to understand what was 
in itY 
A. It was turned over to my settlement man by Mr. Rogers. 
Q. I asked you if you were not interested personally enough 
to know what ·that deed contained? 
A. I have confidence in my employees who look after the 
business turned over to them. 
Q. You told this jury that you had Mr. Rogers 
page 70 ~ understand that you were not assuming anything, 
but you did not look at a deed that he drew to see 
whether anything was said in it about that! 
A. That is right. I did not. 
By Mr. Hazelgrove : 
Q. Were you present at the foreclosure sale Y 
A. I was not. 
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page 71 ~ PELL S. ROGERS, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being recalled 
in rebuttal, further testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
By }rfr. O'Connor: 
Q. To whom did you hand this deed of trust that you drew 
. conveying this property to Euksuzian t 
A. I handed that deed to Mr Saunders M. Brooks, him-
self, personally, sitting at one of the salesmen's desks out in 
the large· office, and he read the deed and commented on the 
deed of trust mentioned in there because of the $8,500.00, and 
he was going to take $6,500.00. He read that deed and com-
mented on it, and I gave him a letter from the bank that had 
been given to me extending the deed of trust to March 27, 
1929, and he read that, he took both that and the letter and 
gave them to one of his employees. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hazelgrove: 
Q. Read it out aloud. 
A. Mr. Brooks read it all the way through. 
Q. Did he read it out aloud? 
A. He read that part about the deed of trust out aloud. 
Q. It did not impress you enough not to know 
page 72 ~ that Euksuzian had not assumed it? . When you 
testified before the Real Estate Commission more 
than a year ago, you thought that he had assumed it f 
A. It was over a year after the deed was written, too. 
Q. You thought he had assumed it, didn't you T: 
A. No, sir. If I said that, I was mistaken. 
Q. Did you remember it better then or now f It was on 
June 27th, 1929. 
Witness: You are speaking of the case when Euksuziau 
brought Brooks & Richardson before the Commiss!on, and 
they were repri:p:Landed f · 
Mr. Baker: The one in which they were acquitted. 
RE-DIRECT EXAlVIINATION. 
By Mr. O'Connor: 
Q. ~Ir. Rogers, ~id l\fr. Saund_ers Brooks, who just test i-
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fied, tell you that he could not blame you if you went back 
on himY 
A. I told l\ir. Brooks after the property was sold at auc-
tion that, if it was a deficit, I '\Vould have to come back on 
him for it. He said he didn't blame me; that he could go back 
on Euksuzian, and he stated that he didn't know 
page 73 ~ that the property was being sold and he was go-
ing to try to upset it because the bank had prom-
ised to let him know and had not done so. 
RE-CROSS EXAl\1INATION. 
By Air. Hazelgrove : , 
Q. Now~ Mr. Rogers, you just referred . to the proceedings 
before the Virginia Real Estate Commission, in which Mr. 
Euksuzian '\vas complainant and Brooks & Richardson were 
respondents. N o,v, don't you know, that those proceedings 
were dismissed? 
A. I know that Brooks & Richardson were reprimanded. 
That is all I know. 
Q. That is all you know? 
A. Yes, sir. I understood there was some decision of the 
Attorney General stating that the Commission could not 
reprimand, but they either had to dismiss or take the license 
away, so the way I understof?d was they withdrew the repri-
mand. 
Q. I did not ask you anything about that just now. You 
volunteered that for the jury to know tha.t complaint had 
been made before the Real Estate Commission. It was not 
necessary to answer my question, w·as it~ It was not neces-
sary to answer the question to tell the jury that, 
page 74 ~ was it? 
to kno~ it. A. Well, I don't suppose it. hurts for the jury 
Q. It was not necessary to answer my question, was it Y 
A. I 'vanted to know if that is the one you referred to. 
Q. That is the only one, isn't it? 
A. No, sir. There is another case in the Circuit Court. 
Brooks & Richardson sued Euksuzian for $3,500.00. 
Q. And got a verdict? 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you ever see the final opinion of the Vi.rginia Real 
Estate Commission? 
A. No, sir, never sa'v the opinion at all. 
~Ir. Hazelgrove: Since this matter came up and he re-
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ferred to the opinion, which was held void by the Attorney 
General, I would like to put in evidence the final opinion. 
lVIr. Williams: Mr. Hazelgrove 's statement was that they 
were acquitted. I think it is collateral matter he brought out 
.and I don't think he can pursue the subject himself. :You 
said they were acquitted and :1\:lr. R.og-ers responded that they 
'vere reprimanded. 
The Oourt= That has nothing to do with it. 
page 75 } 1\tir. Hazelg1·ov-e: We not an exception to Your 
Honor's ruling. 
The Gourt: What Mr. Rogers said was not responsive to 
your question. I don't think what Mr. Baker said had any-
thing to do with it, and I think the whole situation ought to 
go out. · 
Mr. Hazelgrove: I have here the original opinion. 
1\tlr. Williams: We have no objection to its going in. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: Of course, I have none. 
The Court: Gentlemen of the jury, you will exclude from 
your minds and consideration the statement of Mr. Baker in 
this case. The statement of Mr. Rogers that Brooks & Rich-
ardson were reprimanded was not in response to the question 
propounded by Mr. Hazelgrove is not pertinent to this issue 
and the statement by Mr. Baker that they were acquitted is 
not pertinent, so the Court directs you to disregard that 
entirely in your consideration of this case. 
\Vitness stood aside. 
Testimony Closed. 
pag·e 76} Teste this 6th day of June, .1930. 
ERNEST H. WELLS, Judge. 
page 77 } ,Virginia : 
- . In the Hustings Court, Part II, of the City of 
.Richmond. 
Pell S. Rogers 
vs. 
Lynbrook Realty Corporation. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 1. 
After tl1e evideuce on behalf of the plaintiff was intro-
duced in this cause, as disclosed by the Certificate of Evi-
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dence, the defendant then moved the court to exclude all of 
the plaintiff's evidence from consideration of the jury upon 
the ground that said evidence disclosed that the plaintiff was 
not entitled to recover, which motion the court denied, and to 
which ruling of the Court the · defendant, by counsel, duly 
excepted. 
And thereafter at the conclusion of all of the evidence in 
this cause~ as disclosed by the Certificate of Evidence the 
defendant again moved the c.ourt to exclude from the consid-
eration of the· 'jury all· of the plaintiff's evidence upon the 
ground that all of the evidence disclosed that the plaintiff was 
·not entitled to recover, which motion the court, denied, and to 
which ruling of the Court the defendant, by counsel, duly 
excepted. · 
Teste· this 6th day of June, 1930. 
ERNEST H. WELLS, Judge. 
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In the Hustings Court, Part II, of the City of . 
·:Richmond. 
Pell S. Rogers 
vs. 
Lynbrook Realty Corporation. 
CERTIFICATE· OF EXCEPTION NO. 2. 
After all the evidence was introduced in this cause, as s~t 
forth in the Certificate of Evidence, the defendant requested 
the following instructions: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1. 
The Court·instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that the plaintiff, Pell S. Rogers was advised by 
the defendant, Lynbrook Realty Corporation, that it had sold 
the property known as 1817 Hull Street to Simon Euksuzian 
and that said Euksuzian had agreed to assume the first deed 
of trust :for Sixty-five Hundred Dollars ($6,500.00) and re-
quested ·said Pell·S. Rogers to make a deed to said Euksuzian 
direct, and that the said Pell S. Rogers agreed to do this and 
· agreed to accept said Euksuzian in the place of Lynbrook 
Realty Corporation and executed the _deed dated J nn~ 22, 
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1928, to said Euksuzian to said property on Hull Street, then 
the law implies a novation from said circumstance~ and a 
substitution of said I.Jynbrook Realty Corporation and the 
consequent release of said Lynbrook Realty Corporation 
from any liability on the contract of June 12, 1928, and your 
,verdict should be for the defendant. 
INSTRU·CTION NU~IBER 2. 
The Court instructs the jury that when a deed has been 
executed and delivered as a performance of an executory con-
tract for the conveyance of real estate that then the rights of 
the parties rest thereafter solely in the deed although the 
deed may vary from the executory contract. And if you be-
live from the evidence that the plaintiff Pell S. Rogers did 
not require, and the defendant, Lynbrook H.ealty Corpora-
tion, did not actually assume the deed of trust for $6,500.00 
by executing said deed, then your verdict should be for the 
defendant. · 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3. 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that the Lynbrook Realty Corporation 
page 79 ~ contracted to assume the deed of trust for $6,500.00, 
and that said Pell S. Rogers accepted performance 
of said contract by Lynbrook R.ealty Corporation by deed-
ing the said property direct to Euksuzian, then the jury may 
infer an abandonment by said Pell S. Rogers of the right 
to require Lynbrook Realty Corporation to· assume said 
mortgage. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4. 
The Court instructs the jury ·that the contract of J nne 12, 
1928, relied on by the plaintiff is an executory contract and 
being· a ·written contract the interpretation thereof is the ex-
clusive province of the court, and the court proceeding to 
interpret. san1e doth instruct the jury that the Lynbook Re-
alty Corporation has never actually assumed . the payment 
of the first deed of trust for $6,500.00 but has only contracted 
to assume same, and that unless you l1elieve from all of the 
evidence that the Lynbrook Realty Corporation actually as-
sumed the payment of the said deed of trust, your verdict 
should be for the defenda~t. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5. 
'fhe Court instructs the jury that where a party has a 
1\nown right and does not insist upon exercsng same within 
Et reasonable time, the jury may infer a waiver of the right 
· tr. insist upon eompliance, and if the jury believe in this case 
1hat tl1c said Pell S. Rogers did not require the Lynbrook 
Henlty Corporation to actually assume payment of the first 
deed of trust for $6,500 within a reasonable time, then the 
jury may infer that the said Pell S. R.ogers wavied his right, 
nnd if you find that the sa.id Rogers did waive same, that 
ynur verdict should be for the defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NU1\1:BER 6. 
The Conri instructs the jury that under no circumstances 
c'ln the plaintiff recover in this case unless he prove by a 
preponderanee of the evidence that the def.endant actually 
assumed the payment of tl1e said deed of trust for $6,500.00, 
and that the plaintiff Pell S. Rogers has actually paid out 
the amount he claims on account of said deed of trust so as-
sumed, and in no event can he reeover anything: in excess of 
the amount he aetually so paid out, and if the plaintiff fails 
to prove any of the foregoing facts the verdict should be 
for the defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NUl\IIBER 7. 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence tha.t the plaintiff, Pell S. Rogers was ad-
page 80 ~ vised by the defendant, Lynbrook R.ealty Corpo-
ration, that it had sold the property known as 1817 
IIull Street to Simon Euksuzian, and that said Euksuzian 
had ag-reed to assume tl1e first deed of trust for Sixty-five 
Hundred Dollars ($6,500), and requested said Pell S. Rogers 
to make a deed to said Euksuzian direct, and that the said 
·Pell S. Rogers agreed to do this, and agreed to accept said 
Euksuzian in the place of Lynbrook Realty Corporation and 
in substitution· for its liability and executed the deed dated 
.J nne 22, 1928, to said Euksuzian for said property on Hull 
· Street then your verdict should be for the defendant. 
The foregoing instructions numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 
·were requested by the defendant and denied by the court, 
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and to their denial and the denial of each one of them, the 
defendant duly exc-epted. 
Teste this 6th day of June, 1930. 
ERNEST H. WELLS, Jude:-e. 
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In the Hustings Court, Part II, of the City· of 
Richmond. 
Pell S. Rogers 
vs. 
Lynbrook Realty Corporation. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 3. 
The following instructions numbered A, B and D were 
given by the court at the request of the plaintiff, and instruc-
tion number C was given by the Court at the request of the 
defendant after the court had refused to give the instructions 
set forth in Certificate of Exception Number 2 : 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER A. 
The- Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence in this case that the defendant, ·Lynbrook Realty 
Corporation, signed the contract in evidence assuming to pay 
the deed of trust in question and that there was a default 
under the said deed of trust and the property was sold and a 
deficit of $1,029.08 resulted, then you should find your verdict 
for the plaintiff in the amount of such deficit, unless you 
believe from the evidence that the plaintiff agreed with the 
defendant to release and discharge it from any liability 
thereon, and in this connection the Court tells you that the 
burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence any such release and discharge. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER B. 
The Court instructs the Jury that the mere fact that the 
plaintiff deeded the property directly to Euksuzia.n raises no 
presumption that he intended to release and discharge the 
defendant from its obligation under its contract to him, and 
the burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence an agreement either verbal or written on the 
l>4 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
part of the plaintiff to so release and discharge the defend-
ant from its liability on said contract. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER C. 
The Court instructs the Jury_ that although they may be-
lieve from the evidence in this case that the defendant, Lyn-
brook Realty Corporation signed the contract in evidence 
assuming to pay the deed of trust in question and that· there 
was a default under the said deed of trust and the prop-. 
erty was sold and a deficit resulted, yet if you fur-
page 82 ~ ther believe that there was an agreem~nt oral or 
wdften between R.ogers and the Lynbrook Realty 
Corporation that -said property be deeded direct to Euksuzian 
and the said Lynbrook Realty Corporation released from 
said contract, then your verdict should be for the defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER D. 
The Court instructs the jury that to constitute a legal 
contract or agreement there must be a meeting of minds by 
the parties thereto as to the subject matter and the terms 
thereof; and the Court therefore tells you unless you believe 
from the evidence that there was a meeting of minds by Pell 
S. Rogers and Lynbrook R.ealty ·Corporation whereby they 
both agreed to and intended to release· the said defendant 
from its contract of assumption you must find your verdict 
for the plaintiff~ · 
To the giving of the said instructions numbered A, B and 
D, and to each of them the defendant duly excepted upon 
the fallowing grounds, viz: 
As to Instruction Number A upon the ground that it ig-
nored the theory of the defendant that the deed as exe-
cuted and delivered merged all prior negotiations and con-
tracts between the parties, and that the jury were precluded 
by said instruction from inferring a release and discharge 
by the acts of the parties. 
As to Instruction Number B upon the ground that it ig-
nored the theory of the defendant that the deed merged all 
prior negotiations and contracts, and upon the ground that 
said instruction precluded the jury from inferring a release 
from the conduct of the parties. 
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As to Instruction Number D upon the ground that an agree-
ment was not necessary if the jury should _infer a release from 
the conduct of the parties. 
Teste this 6th day of June, 1930. 
ERNEST H. WELLS, Judge. 
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In the Hustings Court, Part II, of the City of 
Richmond. 
Pell S. Rogers 
vs. 
Lynbrook R.ealty Corporation. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 4. 
Be it remembered, and the.court hereby certif}~s, that on the 
trial of this cause, and after the jury had heard the evi-
dence as set out in the Certificate of Evidence,.;and after the 
court bad instructed the jury, as set out in the. Certificate of 
Exception Number 3, and after the argument :bY counsel, 
the jury returned to the court the follo,ving verdict: 
'' \V e the jury on the issue join~d, find ~~r·. t4e plaintiff 
for the sum of $1,029.08 with interest from May 22, 1929. 
JESSE ROSHCHILD, foreman.'' 
Thereupon the defendant, by its counsel, moved the court to 
set aside said verdict and moved the court to enter ·up final 
judgment for the defendant: · 
.. 
( 1) Because said verdict is contrary to the la~. and I evi-
dence. 
(2) Because of misdirec.tion of the jury by the court. 
(3) Because of the failure of the court to sustain the mo-
tion of the defendant to cxclude.all of (he pl~i:ntiff's evidence. 
vVhich motions the court ·9;verruled and to w~ich ruling of 
f"l.1e court the defendant, by counsel; duly excepted. 
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Teste this 6th day of June, 1930. 
ERNEST H. WELLS, Judge. 
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Attorneys and Counsellors, at Law 
American National Bank Building 
R-ichmond, V a. 
:hiadison 4671 
June 10, 1930. 
1\-Ir. Thomas A. Williams, 




In Re: Pell S. Rogers v. Lynbrook Realty Corporation 
You are hereby notified that the undersigned intends ap-
plying to the Clerk of the Hustings Court, Part II, of the City 
of Richmond, Virg·inia, for a transcript of the record in the 
above entitled action for the purpose of applying to the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia for a writ 
of error thereto. 
Yours very truly, 
LYNBROOK: REALTY COR.PORATION 
By WILLIAl\IIS & ~.fULLEN, Counsel. 
The foregoing notice is hereby acceted this 11th day of 
June, 1930. 
THO~fAS A. WILLIAMS, 
Counsel for Pell S. Rogers. 
1\-Iemora.ndum to the Clerk: 
The Clerk will please malw up the foregoing record. 
GBI-I/0 
WILLIA1\1:S & J\IIULLEN 
Counsel for Lynbrook Realty Corporation. 
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pug·e 85 ~ I, vV:. E. DuVal, Clerk of Hustings Court, Part 
II, of the City of Richmond, State of Virginia, do 
hereby eertify that the foregoing is a true transcript of the 
Record in foregoing cause, and I further certify that the no-
tice required by Section 6639 Code of Virginia, was duly given 
in accordance with said section. Also the bond required to be 
given in this case suspending the execution for a period of 
ninety days has been given before the Clerk of this Court 
'vith surety, which surety was approved by the Clerk. 
Costs of Record $42.25. 
Given under my hand this 18 day of August 1930. 
W. E. DuVAL, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
H. STEW ART JONES, C. C. 
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